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Abstract 
 
So long as the UK government liberates itself from the protectionist mindset of the European 
Union and reduces trade barriers after Brexit, and UK businesses respond positively to the 
challenge of increased international competition (through increased productivity and 
exports), the prospects for UK trade and prosperity post-Brexit are very bright indeed. The EU 
itself acknowledges that 90% of future growth in global gross domestic product will be outside 
the EU. The costs of remaining in the EU are very high and not all purely economic: the EU is 
no longer a force for global liberalisation. On the basis of both international and EU law, the 
monetary costs to the UK of leaving the EU should have been fairly low. Similarly, the frictional 
costs to both the UK and the EU of their post-Brexit trade relationship should also be low. 
However, as a consequence of both the concessions made by the UK in order to demonstrate 
its goodwill and the hard line taken by the EU in order to discourage other member states 
from leaving, these costs could well end up being much higher than they need be for both 
sides. Of particular concern is the EU’s ‘level playing field’ demand, laid out in the (albeit non-
binding) Political Declaration for a future trading relationship. This would effectively prevent 
the UK from achieving regulatory autonomy or from pursuing an independent trade policy. 
The Treasury predicts a 7.7% reduction in GDP in the event of ‘no deal’ in which the UK 
retained the existing Common External Tariff with the rest of the world and also imposed the 
same tariffs on trade with the EU. However, EU barriers on trade in food and manufactures 
raise their prices by 20%. If the UK leaves the Customs Union and these barriers are reduced 
from 20% to 10%, UK GDP would rise by 4%. The cost of meeting the excessive regulatory 
standards of the Single Market is equivalent to 2% of GDP. If the UK also leaves the Single 
Market, UK GDP would rise by 6% in total, very similar to the 5.4% increase in GDP following 
Australia’s trade liberalisation in 1986. 
 
Keywords: international trade, free trade agreements, protectionism, tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers, Brexit 
 
JEL classifications: F13, F40, F59 
 
* This is a write-up of a presentation given at the Brexit and Trade conference, organised by 
The UK in a Changing Europe, and held at the British Academy on 2 November 2017. It has 
been updated to account for events that have occurred since then. 
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How bright are the prospects for UK trade and prosperity post-Brexit? The short answer is 
that they will be inversely related to the size of the tariffs on international trade that the UK 
itself sets after Brexit. But both the question and answer can only be fully understood after 
considering two sets of costs: those of remaining in the European Union and those of leaving 
it. Once we have answered these questions, we can examine the different possible future 
trading relationships with both the EU and rest of the world. We end by examining the costs 
and benefits of trading on World Trade Organisation (WTO) terms or what has become known 
as the ‘no deal’ option. 
1. The costs of remaining in the EU 
The EU has created the illusion that it is simultaneously both a worker’s paradise – given the 
social protections it guarantees to workers – and a capitalist’s heaven – given how effectively 
businesses can lobby Brussels to raise barriers against imports from outside the EU.1  It even 
claims that it has brought lasting peace to Europe after centuries of conflict, whereas it is 
NATO that has a much greater entitlement to this claim.  So successful has the EU been in 
perpetrating this myth that it won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. The reality is rather 
different. The costs of remaining in the EU are very high and they are not all purely economic. 
We discuss ten key costs. 
 
1.1 The EU is a fundamentally protectionist trading bloc 
 
First, the EU is a fundamentally protectionist trading bloc. Big business lobbies Brussels for 
more regulations to make it more difficult for small companies to enter the market and 
compete – whether these companies come from the EU or not.2  There is also the Common 
                                                 
1 The most striking evidence for this claim is the support of the Confederation of British Industry and Institute 
of Directors for then Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn – someone who has devoted his entire political career to 
destroying capitalism – in his ambition to keep the UK in the EU Customs Union after Brexit (Benjamin Kentish 
(2018) Business bodies throw support behind Corbyn’s calls to keep customs union after Brexit, Independent, 
27 February).  
2 See: lobbyfacts.eu/reports/lobby-costs/companies; www.scribd.com/document/281758925/Lobbying-in-the-
EU-The-cost-of-a-lack-of-transparency. Simon Boyd, managing director of REIDSteel and a member of the CBI 
Manufacturing Council, argues that ‘The Customs Union is no more than a protectionist racket. …It is the 
opposite of fair trade. It damages many businesses throughout the UK and serves to control the market as the 
big players like. Membership has been harmful for us and other British businesses. It has excluded many of our 
traditional markets, particularly the Commonwealth; it prevents us from making our own trade agreements 
worldwide. … I and many others have been working for decades to try and highlight just how damaging our 
membership of the EU has been to us. We have seen our international trade shrink and have watched over the 
demise of our manufacturing capabilities as businesses have been less able or willing to invest for the future. 
Our productivity has plunged because it is often easier to invest in cheap labour rather than train and invest at 
home. Multinationals have seen fit to export our jobs and expertise to other locations where labour is cheaper 
and incentives are greater, often with help from the EU: our money is being spent to export our jobs and our 
industries. Our massive trade deficit in the Single Market and the Customs Union outweighs all of the other 
downsides and costs of belonging to the EU: nearly 5% of our GDP’ (Simon Boyd (2018) SMEs have felt first-
hand the negative effects of the EU and its Customs Union, Brexit Central, 2 May). 
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Commercial Policy which prohibits member states from negotiating separate trading 
agreements with other countries. 
 
The Customs Union, to which all EU member states belong, imposes the Common External 
Tariff, covering more than 13,000 imported goods, while allowing tariff-free trade between 
member states. While the trade-weighted average EU tariff for non-agricultural products is 
quite low at around 2.7% for non-agricultural products, it is higher for agricultural products 
at 8.1%.3 For certain agricultural products, it is very high as Table 1 shows. It is also high for 
cars at 10%. 
 
Table 1: Average EU tariff by product type (%) 
Dairy products  44.8 
Sugars and confectionery  28.3 
Beverages and tobacco  19.8 
Animal products  17.8 
Cereals and preparations  17.8 
Cars, trucks and lorries 16.0* 
Fruit, vegetables and plants  11.8 
Clothing  11.5 
Fish and fish products  11.4 
Textiles  6.6 
Coffee, tea  5.9 
Oilseeds, fats and oils  5.8 
Other agricultural products  5.0 
Chemicals  4.5 
Leather, footwear etc  4.2 
Transport equipment  4.1 
Petroleum  3.1 
Electrical machinery  2.4 
Other manufactures  2.4 
Minerals and metals  1.9 
Non-electrical machinery  1.7 
Wood, paper etc  0.9 
Cotton  0.0 
Sources: Final bound duties, WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2019, p.90; 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles19_e.pdf 
* 2016-17 data; https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/169/16906.htm 
 
 
                                                 
3 Similarly, the EU average tariffs for industrial products at 4.3% is only a little higher than the US at 3.8%. 
Source: WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2019. 
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As a result of these tariffs, EU consumers are paying an average of 17% above world prices on 
food.4 One example of this is tuna from the Maldives which attracts a 24% tariff, but is tariff 
free if it is destined for processing in the EU, thereby allowing European manufacturers to 
capture the bulk of the value added of this import from a developing country.5 Another is 
cocoa: ‘While the import duties for unprocessed cocoa beans is rather small, the EU charges 
30% for processed cocoa products like chocolate bars or cocoa powder, and 60% for some 
other refined products containing cocoa’.6, 7 
 
There are also significant non-tariff barriers (NTBs), also known as technical barriers to trade 
(TBT).8 These are often justified on environmental or health and safety grounds in line with 
the EU’s ‘precautionary principle’,9 but are in reality mostly just forms of protectionism and 
market distortion. One example of this is the ban on Basmati rice from India due to concerns 
about pesticides and residues that can be barely measured scientifically. Another is the 
General Data Protection Regulation which prevented services involving data flow being 
included in the trade deal with Canada.  Shanker Singham10 argues that ‘more and more EU 
regulation is prescriptive and anti-competitive in nature. The EU will not grow vibrantly but 
will continue to destroy wealth for its own citizens and also for the rest of the world. The EU 
is therefore no longer a force for global liberalisation’.11, 12 
 
It is also very important to note that NTBs are illegal under World Trade Organisation rules 
which forbid any form of discrimination on standards between home and foreign products or 
                                                 
4 The Institute for Economic Affairs estimates that the Common Agricultural Policy raises food prices by 17%; 
https://iea.org.uk/blog/abolish-the-cap-let-food-prices-tumble 
5 Ahmed Shiaan (2017) On behalf of the Maldives, I don’t just respect the Brexit vote – I welcome it, Brexit 
Central, 11 December. 
6 http://www.dw.com/en/high-duties-keep-food-imports-from-poor-countries-out-of-europe/a-5127705 
7 There are many more examples: see, e.g., Kevin Dowd (2018) Remainer Lord Hannay is wrong about EU 
tariffs on African imports, Brexit Central, 24 April. 
8 These include quotas, prohibitions, import licences, product standards (such as regulatory standards on 
labelling and testing), dual certification, customs documentation requirements and border delays, and rules of 
origin requirements. Rules of origin are the criteria used to determine the national source of a product. They 
are used to set duties and restrictions on imported products.  For example, requiring a minimum percentage of 
components to be sourced from the domestic economy of the trading partner. See: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm 
9 The precautionary principle; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al32042 
10  Singham is a well-known trade expert then at the Legatum Institute Special Trade Commission, currently 
Head of Trade at the Centre for Economics and Business Research. He is the author of a General Theory of 
Trade and Competition and Trade Liberalisation and Competitive Markets. 
11 Shanker Singham (2018) EU’s regulation obsession is protectionist in nature, Daily Telegraph, 22 February. 
12 This is particularly true of financial services regulation as Ashley Fox MEP points out: ‘Many of my colleagues 
in Europe get very worried about entrepreneurs and banks solving problems. They sometimes see innovation 
as something that should be controlled and managed. As a result, the EU often ends up writing blunt 
regulations that stunt progress and hurt European competitiveness, despite the best intentions. We have got 
into the habit of writing regulations that are not flexible or adaptive but blanket restrictions applied across 
countries and sectors; reworkings of current law rather than thinking differently’. See: Ashley Fox (2018) Time 
the EU updated its way of regulating financial services, Financial News, 14 May. 
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between the foreign products of different countries.13 The same applies to services.14 Dyson 
– which manufactures its products in Asia – has won a case in the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU)15 against the EU Commission by successfully arguing that EU energy 
labelling regulations were based on tests which favoured German manufacturers.16 
 
Then there is the Single Market17 which is claimed to be the jewel in the crown of the EU with 
its four freedoms of movement – of goods, services, capital and people.  But the Single Market 
is not a free trade area, rather it is a single protectionist zone where regulations are 
harmonised and all goods and services produced must satisfy these regulations whether or 
not they are sold in other member states. Only 6% of UK companies export to the EU – 
accounting for 13.8% of GDP in 201818 – yet 100% of UK regulations are determined in 
Brussels, including for the 94% of UK companies that do not trade with the EU.19, 20 
 
The UK, in particular, has seen little economic benefit from the Single Market.21 Table 2 shows 
the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of UK goods exports to the 14 original members 
(EU14) of the Single Market from 1999 to 2018.  Column 1 shows the real CAGR (inflation 
adjusted to 2016 GDP) of UK exports to the EU14 was 0.56%.22  Eight of the EU14 states are 
underlined, because UK goods exports to them have declined in real terms over these two 
decades rather than grown.  The third column shows that the cumulative trade deficit was 
£740.35bn. 
                                                 
13 WTO (2018a), WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT); 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm  
14 WTO (2018b), The GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services); 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm 
15 More commonly known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
16 See Patrick Minford (2018, p.6) How the Civil Service has misled us on the Costs of Brexit and the Customs 
Union, Economists for Free Trade, May; https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/EFT-How-the-Civil-Service-has-misled-us-on-costs-of-Brexit-and-the-customs-union-
May-2018.pdf. But, Dyson lost a follow-up case in which the CJEU decided that ‘no information relating to the 
conditions under which the energy efficiency of vacuum cleaners was measured may be added to the energy 
label’; https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-07/cp180117en.pdf. This indicates 
that British producers face a constant battle with the EU to ensure that WTO anti-discrimination rules are 
upheld. 
17 Also known as the Internal Market. 
18 Statistics on UK-EU trade, House of Commons Briefing Paper, Number 7851, 16 December 2019; 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7851/CBP-7851.pdf. UK GDP in 2018 was 
£2,061,408; https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/abmi/qna 
19 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36029211 
20 Richard Tice, co-chair of Leave Means Leave and chair of the Brexit Party, argues that ‘Being encased by the 
protectionist wall of the EU’s Customs Union has kept prices of food, clothing and footwear artificially high, 
while uncontrolled unskilled EU immigration thanks to our membership of the Single Market has depressed 
the wages of working people. These two factors have conspired to hit the pockets of the poorest in society’ 
(Richard Tice (2018) Start measuring the countdown to freedom and opportunity in days, not years, Brexit 
Central, 27 March). 
21 In 2005, an internal Treasury report, which later emerged because of a Freedom of Information request, 
found that the Single Market had only a marginal impact on UK trade.  
22 Had we assumed that the present 27 EU members had all been Single Market members over the same 
period, the CAGR of UK goods exports to all 27 would have been slightly higher at 0.78%. 
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Table 2: Real growth of UK exports of goods to 14 other members of the EU Single 
Market 1999-2018 and cumulative trade balance 
 
Trade partner CAGR UK goods 
exports 
% 
Divergence from 
CAGR of partner's 
GDP (% points) 
20-year trade 
balance £bn 
Austria 0.67 -0.98 -24.75 
Belgium 0.57 -0.99 -85.60 
Denmark -0.69 -1.95 -29.58 
Finland -2.09 -3.68 -26.35 
France -0.05 -1.45 -32.66 
Germany 1.06 -0.32 -378.28 
Greece -2.30 -2.53 14.46 
Ireland 1.53 -3.26 133.63 
Italy -0.37 -0.76 -87.50 
Luxembourg 0.46 -2.47 -7.81 
Netherlands 1.56 0.02 -137.99 
Portugal -2.82 -3.53 -8.58 
Spain -0.26 -2.12 -44.42 
Sweden -0.30 -2.59 -24.92 
EU14 0.56 -0.81 -740.35 
EU27 0.78 -2.59 -868.79 
Data sources: 
• https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/datasets/uktradeallcoun
triesseasonallyadjusted    
• Export deflator: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/ 
timeseries/ybfw/ukea#othertimeseries 
• https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD 
 
Source: Michael Burrage and Phil Radford (2020), WTO vs the EU:  An assessment of the UK's trade 
relationships 1999-2018, Civitas, forthcoming. 
 
 
By contrast, UK goods exports to the 14 leading countries (denoted WTO14) that the UK 
trades with on WTO terms – meaning in the absence of a preferential trade agreement – had 
a CAGR of 3.58%,23 compared with 0.56% for the EU14: they grew more than six times faster 
between 1999 and 2018. 
One explanation frequently offered for why UK trade with the rest of the world (ROW) has 
grown at a faster rate than UK trade with the EU is that the ROW's economies have grown at 
a faster rate over the last 20 years.  The aggregate CAGR of the GDP of the WTO14 was 3.53% 
                                                 
23 Table 2 of Michael Burrage and Phil Radford (2020) WTO vs the EU:  an assessment of the UK's trade 
relationships 1999-2018, Civitas, forthcoming. 
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between 1999 and 2018.24  This is indeed significantly higher than the 1.45% GDP CAGR of 
the EU14.25 
However, Column 2 of Table 2 shows the CAGRs of the UK exports to the EU14 compared with 
the CAGR of their GDP.  The growth of UK goods exports to the EU14 over these two decades 
was below the growth of the GDP of them all, except for the Netherlands.26  This is reinforced 
by the trade figures for 2019. UK goods exports to non-EU countries increased by 13.6% over 
2018 to £201.5bn, while UK goods exports to the EU fell by 0.9% to £170.6bn.27  We trade on 
WTO terms with some key non-EU countries, including the US (the UK's biggest single trading 
partner), China (the UK's third biggest trading partner after Germany), Japan, Canada, 
Australia, India and Brazil.  Despite this, our trade with these countries has grown at a faster 
rate than with the EU where trade is supposed to be 'frictionless'.  Further, Table 3 shows that 
the UK mostly has a trade surplus with non-EU countries ‒ contrasting with the trade deficits 
shown in Table 2. 
This helps to explain why UK exports to the EU have fallen from 60% of the total to 45% since 
the Single Market was introduced. Goods exports to the EU are 50% of total exports, 
amounting to 8.1% of GDP. Services account for 80% of the UK economy but only 40% of the 
UK’s service exports28 go to the EU,29 amounting to just 5.7% of GDP. The result was a £28bn 
services surplus but a £94bn goods deficit with the EU, leaving an overall £66bn trade deficit 
in 2018.30 In 2019, the EU27 had an even bigger trade surplus of €125 bn with the UK: this is 
62% of the EU27’s total global trade surplus in goods last year.31 The UK will account for 
around 40% of EU exports to the rest of the world in 2020.32 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD 2010 
25 And also higher than the 1.73% growth rate of the EU27. 
26 This could be explained by the Rotterdam effect:  goods from EU member states exported via the port of 
Rotterdam will be recorded as Dutch exports.   
27 Hugo Duncan and James Salmon, Exports hit record high ahead of Brexit:  Sales of UK goods to EU fall 0.9% 
but soar 14% to the rest of the world, This is Money, 11 February 2020; 
https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article-7993135/Sales-UK-goods-EU-fall-0-9-soar-14-rest-
world.html 
28 UK’s service exports are 44% of total exports. 
29 This figure has not increased since 1999. 52% of UK service exports to the EU comprise financial services and 
other business services (mainly legal, accounting, advertising, research and development, architectural, 
engineering, and other professional and technical services). 
30 Statistics on UK-EU trade, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, Number 7851, 16 December 2019; 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7851/CBP-7851.pdf 
31 EU finally shows how badly it needs UK’s business, revealing 2019 figures, Brexit Facts4EU.Org, 15 February 
2020; https://facts4eu.org/news/2020_feb_uk_trade_essential_for_eu27 
32 Liam Halligan (2020) The EU is fatally complacent about the crisis that is about to engulf it, Daily 
Telegraph, 17 February 2020; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/02/17/eu-fatally-complacent-crisis-
engulf/ 
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Table 3:  UK trade with non-EU countries (goods and 
services), 1999-2018 
 Exports Imports Balance 
£ billion % of total £ billion % of total £ billion 
1999 114.9 46.2 116.2 44.1 -1.3 
2000 129.2 46.8 137.8 46.7 -8.6 
2001 132.1 46.3 139.3 44.9 -7.2 
2002 131.9 46.0 133.2 41.9 -1.3 
2003 143.5 47.8 138.5 42.3 5.0 
2004 152.4 48.7 150.3 43.4 2.1 
2005 170.1 48.8 167.3 43.8 2.8 
2006 184.1 46.1 186.3 43.3 -2.2 
2007 194.7 48.9 192.5 45.6 2.2 
2008 215.5 50.2 219.1 47.3 -3.7 
2009 211.5 51.7 207.2 47.9 4.0 
2010 235.2 51.9 237.2 48.9 -1.9 
2011 266.3 52.3 258.9 49.4 7.4 
2012 279.5 54.4 261.6 49.0 17.9 
2013 298.1 55.8 269.0 48.3 28.9 
2014 293.1 55.2 263.6 47.4 29.5 
2015 305.5 57.6 262.6 47.2 42.9 
2016 319.5 56.3 281.6 47.0 37.9 
2017 348.2 55.3 308.8 47.2 39.4 
2018 351.2 54.7 322.6 47.4 28.7 
Source: Statistics on UK-EU trade, House of Commons Briefing Paper, 
Number 7851, 16 December 2019; 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7851/CBP-
7851.pdf 
 
 
Even strong supporters of the EU concede that the Single Market is ‘not visible in the macro 
statistics…. the data are telling us a different story – that the Single Market is a giant economic 
non-event, for both the EU and the UK’.33  Fredrik Erixon and Rosita Georgieva go further: 
 
New initiatives to reform the Single Market are often presented as initiatives to 
“complete the Single Market”. However, they have all fallen substantially short on that 
ambition, and Europe is far away from having a Single Market. In fact, it is further 
away from it now than ten years ago. The European economy has undergone profound 
structural changes, and as the economy has shifted profile, it has moved further into 
sectors and areas where there is very little of the Single Market. The more Europe’s 
                                                 
33 Wolfgang Münchau (2015) Would it actually matter if we left the EU?, Financial Times, 18 June. The UK has 
seen little benefit from its membership of the EU. Annual average real per capita GDP growth was 2.4% during 
1950-1973, 1.8% during 1973-1995, 2.6% during 1995-2007 and 0.2% during 2007-2018  
(https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/united-kingdom/gdp-per-capita-growth). 
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economy grows dependent on services and the digital sector, the less Single Market 
there will be in Europe. 
 
Arguably, the piecemeal approach has prevented Europe from reaping the gains of 
structural change, and the relative policy conditions between sectors have damaged 
Europe’s desire to grow faster on the back of new sectors and services. The failings of 
Europe’s Single Market are becoming ever more evident and, left unaddressed, will 
cause real economic disintegration in Europe and depress the rates of productivity and 
economic growth. 
 
Furthermore, given the vast complexity of regulations in Europe, and the increasing 
layers of bureaucracy they entail, it is difficult to see how improvements could be made 
without a vast overhaul of the structure of regulations and the design of the Single 
Market. And such a reform has to start from a completely different proposition: 
Europe’s ambition should not be to continue building its Single Market, it should be to 
create a European market. As reforms are moving closer to areas like digital services, 
energy, and advanced business services, it is evident that the improvements that can 
be made in Europe’s integration is less about classic Single Market reforms and more 
about building adequate market institutions and advance structural reform.34 
 
1.2 The EU seriously misallocates resources 
 
Second, the EU seriously misallocates resources. Take the EU Budget: 37% goes to farmers,35 
mostly to the richest farmers with the largest farms. Yet agriculture accounts for only 1% of 
GDP across the EU. The Common Agricultural Policy encourages overproduction. We used to 
have wine lakes and butter mountains. Now we have the surplus production being dumped 
in overseas markets. A recent example is the dumping of tinned tomatoes in Africa, in 
particular Ghana, which leads to a significant distortion to the local market and a reduction in 
the income of Ghanaian tomato farmers.36  
 
The EU’s Landfill Directive caps the landfilling of municipal waste, with the cap set at 10% by 
2035. Surplus waste has been shipped to countries like China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia 
and India for disposal and recycling due to insufficient recycling capacity in Europe. At the end 
of 2017,  China put a strict limit on the import of ‘foreign garbage’, other countries followed, 
and within weeks all the EU’s recycling plants were overflowing. So much for the EU priding 
                                                 
34 Fredrik Erixon and Rosita Georgieva (2016) What is wrong with the Single Market?, European Centre for 
International Political Economy.  
35 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/how-it-works/fact-check_en 
36 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2823015.stm 
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itself ‘on being an environmental leader ‒ a champion of “the circular economy”, in which 
energy and resources are carefully husbanded, reused and recycled’.37 
 
1.3 The EU is a political project that is fundamentally anti-democratic 
Third, the EU is a political project that is fundamentally anti-democratic as a whole range of 
European leaders have made abundantly clear: 
• ‘Europe's nations should be guided towards the super-state without their people 
understanding what is happening. This can be accomplished by successive steps, each 
disguised as having an economic purpose, but which will eventually and irreversibly 
lead to federation’ (Jean Monnet, founding father of the EU, letter to a friend, 30 April 
1952)38, 39, 40 
• ‘We’re not here to make a Single Market – that doesn’t interest me – but to make a 
political union’ (Jacques Delors, former EU Commissioner)41 
• ‘We now seek political unification, the construction of a United States of Europe’ 
(Helmut Kohl, German chancellor, 1991, following German reunification)42 
• ‘There can be no democratic choice against the European Treaties’ (Jean-Claude 
Juncker, president of the European Commission, in 'Greece: The dangerous game', Le 
Figaro, 1 February 2015) 
• ‘In truth, Brussels is a democracy-free zone’ (Yanis Varoufakis, former Greek finance 
minister, The Guardian, 3 May 2017). 
 
Even if political union per se is not anti-democratic, the way it is being achieved – by stealth 
and against the expressed consent of the peoples of Europe – certainly is.43 
                                                 
37 By Paola Tamma (2018) China’s trash ban forces Europe to confront its waste problem, Politico, 21 February;  
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-recycling-china-trash-ban-forces-europe-to-confront-its-waste-
problem/ 
38 Monnet also went on to say ‘I have always believed that Europe would be built through crises, and that it 
would be the sum of their solutions. But the solutions had to be proposed and applied’ (Quoted in John 
Lanchester (2016) The Failure of the Euro, CAPX, 24 October; http://capx.co/external/the-failure-of-the-euro/) 
39 Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, goes further than this and wants a unified Europe and not 
just a federal Europe (this was mentioned to Nigel Farage at their meeting in Brussels on 8 January 2018 and 
reported on Farage’s LBC show on 14 January 2018). 
40 Adrian Hilton has used the same words in The Principality and Power of Europe: Britain and the Emerging 
Holy European Empire, Dorchester House Publications, Rickmansworth, 1997. 
41 John Ishiyam, William J. Miller, and Eszter Simon (Eds) (2015) Handbook on Teaching and Learning in Political 
Science and International Relations, Edward Elgar, p.379. 
42 John Ishiyam, William J. Miller, and Eszter Simon (Eds) (2015) Handbook on Teaching and Learning in Political 
Science and International Relations, Edward Elgar, p.379. 
43 A particularly significant illustration of this statement is the way in which the EU Constitutional Treaty – 
designed to set up a United States of Europe with a president, a foreign minister, an army, and an anthem – 
failed to get ratified in 2005 – when the French and Dutch rejected it in referenda – only for it to re-emerge as 
the Lisbon Treaty which was then ratified by member state parliaments – without a referendum – in 2007  (see 
James Holland (2017) Europe is still living with the consequences of the Lisbon Treaty, CAPX, 15 December). 
Similarly, the way in which the 1972 European Communities Act – which took the UK into what became the EU 
– was passed in the House of Commons by means of a secret agreement between the Tory Chief Whip, Francis 
Pym, and pro-European Labour MPs, such as Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams, was described as anti-democratic 
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There is supposed to be ‘double democracy’ in the EU – represented by the European Council 
and the European Parliament – but the reality is that the EU is run by the bureaucrats of the 
European Commission who run rings around ministers from national governments44 as well 
as EU parliamentarians.  
 
A recent notorious example of this was the appointment of Martin Selmayr, former chief of 
staff (‘head of cabinet’) to Jean-Claude Juncker, as secretary-general of the European 
Commission in February 2018, following an internally advertised vacancy for deputy 
secretary-general. There was only one other candidate for this post, Clara Martinez Alberola, 
Selmayr’s own deputy as chief of staff. She dropped out of the running and Selmayr was duly 
appointed deputy secretary-general. Within nine minutes of Selmayr’s appointment, the 
incumbent secretary-general, Alexander Italianer, resigned and Selmayr was promoted to 
secretary-general, while Clara Martinez Alberola was promoted to chief of staff, Selmayr’s old 
job. There was outrage in the European parliament, with French MEP Françoise Grossetête 
describing Selmayr’s appointment as a ‘mystification worthy of the Chinese Communist 
Party’. But at a parliamentary hearing in March 2018, Günter Oettinger, the commissioner for 
budget and human resources, insisted that the rules were followed in ‘the supranational spirit 
of the European public administration’ and Juncker said he would resign if Selmayr’s 
appointment was overturned.45 But, in September 2018, Emily O’Reilly, the European 
Ombudsman, said the appointment had revealed ‘four instances of maladministration’, and 
‘risked jeopardising the hard won record of high EU administrative standards and 
consequently, the public trust’.46 The Ombudsman's statement was rejected by the 
Commission and Selmayr kept his job.47 
 
In 2011, Brussels removed national elected governments in Italy and Greece and replaced 
them with ‘technical governments’ run by Eurocrats – Mario Monti, a former EU 
commissioner, in Italy, and Lucas Papademos, a former vice-president of the European 
Central Bank, in Greece. 
 
                                                 
by Tony Benn: ‘It was a coup d’état by a political class who didn’t believe in popular sovereignty. That’s what it 
was – a coup d’état. The power was seized by parliamentarians.  They seized power that did not belong to them 
and used it to take away the rights of those they represented’ (Europe: Them or US – An Island Apart, BBC2, 12 
April 2016; https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/proginfo/2016/15/europe-them-or-us). 
44 This was well illustrated in an interview with former UK government minister Kenneth Baker conducted by 
Peter Hennessy on BBC Radio 4’s Reflections programme on 23 August 2016.  Lord Baker reported that it is 
common for European Commission civil servants to come up with proposals which were rejected by ministers 
from national governments only to come back with a virtually identical set of proposals a few months after 
these ministers have moved on to other responsibilities; http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b07pgvjg 
45 Bruno Waterfield (2018) Anger grows over aide promoted by Juncker, The Times, 27 March. 
46 Jim Brunsden (2018) EU watchdog criticises promotion of Martin Selmayr, Financial Times, 4 September. 
47 Although he was subsequently appointed to be the EU's Permanent Representative to Austria. 
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All this is little better than authoritarianism –  which makes it much harder for the Commission 
to deal with other forms of authoritarianism in the EU. On 20 December 2017, the 
Commission activated Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)48 against Poland citing 
‘a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law’ on the grounds that the Polish government’s 
recent reform of the judicial system threatened the independence of the judiciary in violation 
of the EU’s common values as defined in Article 2.49 The Commission has proposed an 
injunction against Poland which could lead to sanctions, including the loss of voting rights. 
However, the proposal requires unanimity by member states and Hungary’s prime minister, 
Viktor Orbán, has promised to block it.50 
 
More shocking still is the way the British establishment of senior politicians and civil servants 
hid from the electorate the real objectives of the European Union at the time the UK joined 
in 1973 (what was then the European Economic Community and which became the EU in 
1993). This is clearly shown in a classified paper prepared by a senior civil servant for the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in April 1971 and labelled FCO30/1048. The paper – which 
was initially withheld under the Official Secrets Act – made it clear that the EU was preparing 
for economic, monetary and fiscal union, with a common foreign and defence policy. It also 
made clear that ‘Community law’ would take precedence over UK courts and that ever more 
power would pass away from the UK parliament to Brussels. The paper acknowledged this 
would lead to a ‘popular feeling of alienation from Government’ and politicians were advised 
‘not to exacerbate public concern by attributing unpopular measures… to the remote and 
unmanageable workings of the Community’. It anticipated that this strategy could last ‘for 
this century at least’ – by which time the UK would be so subordinated to Brussels, it would 
be impossible to leave the EU.51 
 
1.4 The purposive nature of EU law 
  
Fourth, is the ‘purposive’ nature of EU law52 which allows the CJEU to interpret and 
reinterpret the wording of EU laws in line with the European Commission’s (often changing) 
                                                 
48 More commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty. 
49 For an alternative interpretation of Poland’s actions, see Andrea Hossó (2018) Central Europe and Spain 
show the EU’s double standards in enforcing ‘democratic values’, Brexit Central, 3 January. 
50 Alex Barker, Michael Peel and James Shotter (2017) EU set for unprecedented rebuke to Poland over 
‘authoritarianism’, Financial Times, 20 December. 
51 Lara Deauville (2018) We were lied to! Secret document FCO 30/1048 kept truth about EU from British for 
30 years, Daily Express, 12 May. 
52 http://e-lawresources.co.uk/Purposive-approach.php 
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intentions.53, 54 This is reinforced by the Lugano doctrine whereby the CJEU claims exclusive 
competence in increasing areas of private international law.55 This contrasts with the clarity 
and precision of English laws. A further issue relates to the EU legal convention that 
everything is prohibited unless it is permitted, which requires constant appeals to the CJEU 
to grant permission. This contrasts with the English common law tradition where everything 
is permitted unless it is prohibited.56 These factors explain why many EU companies prefer to 
draw up contracts subject to English rather than EU law because of the greater legal certainty 
of interpretation.  
 
A key illustration of the purposive nature of EU law took place on 10 December 2018 when 
the CJEU ruled that the UK could, ‘as a sovereign country’, unilaterally revoke Article 50 of the 
Treaty on European Union, ‘since it would be inconsistent with the EU treaties’ purpose of 
creating an ever closer union amongst the peoples of Europe to force the withdrawal of a 
member state against its will’.57  Yet on 29 March 2017, when the UK triggered Article 50, the 
European Commission stated ‘It is up to the United Kingdom to trigger Article 50. But once 
triggered, it cannot be unilaterally reversed. Notification is a point of no return. Article 50 
does not provide for the unilateral withdrawal of notification’. The CJEU’s ruling shows clearly 
that the CJEU is a political court and not a neutral interpreter of EU law – and is more than 
willing to step in to support the Commission’s strategy when necessary – in this case, to 
frustrate Brexit. 
                                                 
53 German lawyer Gunnar Beck argues that ‘It is difficult to overstate the case that the [CJEU] is neither an 
impartial nor a conventional court. … [I]n interpreting EU law the [CJEU]  does not … accord primacy to the 
ordinary meaning of words as most other international courts. Instead the [CJEU]  adopts an ultra-flexible 
approach which allows the [CJEU]  to choose between various interpretative criteria – literal, contextual, 
purposive and meta-teleological – and to give the greatest weight to whichever criterion best promotes a pro-
EU outcome. For instance, this approach allows the [CJEU]  to depart from the wording in favour of a purposive 
interpretation even where the wording of the relevant provision is neither ambiguous nor leads to an absurd 
outcome. Purposive interpretations generally give courts far greater interpretative room for manoeuvre than 
text-based interpretations. Specifically, the problem with purposive interpretations of law is that courts, and 
the [CJEU]  more so than any other court, do not confine themselves to purposes written into the documents 
they are asked to interpret and has used the purposive approach to resolve legal disputes concerning the 
distribution of powers between the EU and its members in a pro-integrationist manner. In this manner, the 
court has over time and without textual support in the Treaties substantially extended the scope of EU law and 
established its own judicial oversight over many areas of national law. It has not infrequently done so in a 
departure from clear language in the Treaties or EU legislation’. (Gunnar Beck (2018) The European Court of 
Justice should not adjudicate Treaty rights in post-Brexit Britain, Brexit Central, 4 May). 
54 As a counter to such criticisms, one referee argued that: ‘There are valid reasons why a purposive approach 
is taken by the Court when interpreting EU law, not least the number of official languages and the difficulties 
in finding a single universal meaning for certain words and concepts’. 
55 http://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/pliki/pw/y13_niedzwiedz.pdf 
56 A current example is the General Data Protection Regulation which is having a ‘stifling impact’ on businesses 
and organisations that possess ‘personal data’ which could include anything written about a person in an 
email, for example, and hence susceptible to a subject access request (see Daniel Stafford (2018) The GDPR 
chaos is a reminder of how taking back control will allow us to make better laws, Conservativehome, 3 May). 
57 https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-12/cp180191en.pdf; 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-court-case-ecj-ruling-article-50-theresa-may-deal-uk-
european-court-justice-latest-a8675541.html 
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Even more concerning, the supremacy of EU law and its direct effect were created by judicial 
fiat, not by any treaty agreed by member states.58 Direct effect enables individuals to invoke 
a European Act before a national court, irrespective of whether a national law test exists, 
therefore ensuring the application and effectiveness of European law in all member states.59 
This means that ‘once in-place these [principles] enabled – through subsequent case law – 
the consolidation and expansion of the EU’s supreme legal order and steady subjugation of 
the democratic processes within the member states and the erosion of the jurisdiction of 
domestic law’.60 
1.5 The folly of introducing the euro 
Fifth, there is the folly of introducing the euro across a group of countries whose economies 
were so disparate that the operation of a single monetary policy with a single Eurozone 
interest rate was inevitably going to lead to a pattern of booms and busts in the peripheral 
states when the interest rate is set to meet the needs of core economies, such as Germany.  
In addition, the way in which exchange rates were fixed at the start of monetary union 
resulted in Germany joining at too low an exchange rate, while the peripheral countries joined 
at too high an exchange rate. This inevitably led to the mainly northern members of the 
Eurozone, especially Germany, building up large trade surpluses61 and the southern 
members, such as Spain, building up corresponding deficits.   
 
In unified or federal states, such as the UK and US, the national government is able to use 
fiscal stabilisation policies to transfer resources from surplus to deficit regions to prevent 
recessions in the latter.  But Germany refuses to take part in such a ‘transfer union’ resulting 
in a widening North/South split on the issue of fiscal and economic responsibility.  Germany 
insists the deficits are removed by the other economies becoming as efficient as it is.62 The 
deficits building up in TARGET2, the Eurozone payments system,63 by countries such as Spain 
and Italy,64 are so serious that it is very likely that the Eurozone will implode – and do so 
                                                 
58 Respectively in the following cases: Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 and Case C-26/62 Van Gen den 
Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR I 
59 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14547 
60 The imperial court across the sea: why those on the left, who long to re-join the EU, will be conveniently 
ignoring the Court of Justice, Briefings for Britain, 17 February 2020; 
https://briefingsforbritain.co.uk/conveniently-ignoring-the-court-of-justice/ 
61 Not only within the EU, but also globally. 
62 The first budget of the new German finance minister, Olaf Scholz, is as rigid as that of his predecessor, 
Wolfgang Schäuble, in its adherence to balanced budgets, debt repayment and fiscal discipline (Jeremy Warner 
(2018) Trump may actually be doing some good in targeting the Eurozone’s destabilising trade surplus, Daily 
Telegraph, 8 May). 
63 TARGET2 is the high-value real-time gross settlement payment system for the euro, comprising the national 
high-value payment systems of the 19 Eurozone member states, the euro-denominated high-value payment 
systems in five non-Eurozone EU member states, and the arrangements between TARGET2-participating 
central banks and the ECB to make cross-border payments.  All business in euros contracted with Eurosystem 
members must be settled through TARGET2, and it also carries the main financial markets business between 
financial institutions, as well as the settlements of balances in other Financial Markets Infrastructures. 
64 http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
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sooner rather than later.65 In the meantime, the southern member states are stuck in a 
permanent Japanese-style deflation trap.66 
 
1.6 The demographic ageing of the EU’s population 
Sixth, is the demographic ageing of the EU’s population, resulting from a combination of rising 
life expectancy and declining fertility.  Europe’s share of the world’s population has fallen 
from 20% in 1900 to 7% today, and could well fall to 4% by 2100 when the global population 
reaches 12bn people.67 Jean-Claude Juncker has conceded that ‘We are demographically 
weakened, and will remain so. …Economically, we see the end of Europe’s glorious years 
compared with what others are doing. …The European Union is not going very well’.68  
Douglas Carswell, the former MP for Clacton, somewhat unkindly likened the UK’s 
membership of the EU to being ‘shackled to a corpse’.69 
 
1.7 Encouragement of regional separatist movements  
 
Seventh, the EU has inadvertently encouraged regional separatist movements to develop in 
a number of member states in the mistaken belief that these regions can become 
‘independent’ members of the EU ‘with a seat at the top table’. Current examples are 
Scotland, Catalonia and Corsica.70 Now, the EU does not directly support this, and Jean-Claude 
Juncker has made clear that he does not want ‘an EU with 95 different countries tomorrow, 
or the day after. We would lose control. National unity and European unity are things that go 
together’.71 Yet, as US economist Dani Rodrik points out ‘the nation state has proved 
remarkably resilient and remains the main determinant of the global distribution of income, 
the primary locus of market-supporting institutions, and the chief repository of personal 
attachments and affiliations…The nation state remains the only game in town when it comes 
to providing the regulatory and legitimising arrangements on which markets rely’.72 This view 
                                                 
65 See David Blake (2018) TARGET2: The silent bailout system that keeps the euro afloat; 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3182995. Italian senator Alberto Bagnai says that 
‘Everybody now knows that there will have to be a negotiated orderly dismantling of the euro’ (quoted in 
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2018) Whoever governs Italy will destroy the euro from within, Daily Telegraph, 7 
March). 
66 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2018) Bundesbank back in charge of ECB, sending shivers through Italy, Daily 
Telegraph, 8 May). 
67 Professor Hans Rosling (2017) Don’t panic, This World, BBC2, 9 February. 
68 Matthew Holehouse (2015) Europe's glory days at an end, warns Juncker, Daily Telegraph, 22 October; 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5889_en.htm 
69 Rowena Mason (2012), Britain 'shackled to corpse' of EU, says Douglas Carswell, Daily Telegraph, 26 
October. 
70 Virtually every member state of the EU has similar movements, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_separatist_movements_in_Europe 
71 ‘No repression in Catalonia, Spain is not Yugoslavia’, Tanjug, 27 October 2017; 
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2017&mm=10&dd=27&nav_id=102659 
72 Dani Rodrik (2017) Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy, Princeton University Press. 
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is, of course, inconsistent with  Juncker’s own federalist objectives for the EU which are likely 
to lead to a dangerous weakening of the nation states of Europe without replacing them with 
anything that is sufficiently resilient and robust and which would command the same degree 
of loyalty.73 Those, like the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, who want a unitary 
United States of Europe, can only achieve this by first breaking and then breaking up the 
nation states of Europe into regions. 
 
1.8 Increasing euroscepticism  
Eighth, there is increasing euroscepticism in the EU – dismissed as ‘populism’ by europhiles – 
demonstrated by the East/West split over the immigration and internal security crises. The 
Visegrád Group, comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, is challenging 
the authority of Brussels by refusing to accept migrant quotas imposed by Brussels, following 
German chancellor Angela Merkel’s unilateral decision to allow 1.5m migrants into Europe in 
2015.74 Viktor Orbán has said: ‘All the institutions of the EU have utterly failed. Neither the 
European Commission, nor the European Council, nor the European Parliament protected the 
Schengen Treaty’. Some members of the Visegrád Group are even proud to call themselves 
‘illiberal democracies’. 
 
Jean Asselborn, then Luxembourg’s foreign minister, responded by saying that the Visegrád 
Group’s refusal to accept immigrants and relieve the pressure on Greece and Italy was the 
biggest problem facing Europe. He suggested that only the CJEU could force the group’s 
members to fulfil their migrant quota. Italian MEP Marco Zanni, from the Europe of Nations 
and Freedom Group, predicted a growing tension within the EU as its leaders fail to address 
with these issues.75  
 
In September 2018, the European parliament voted to introduce sanctions against Hungary 
on account of its treatment of its Roma community and its challenge to the independence of 
its courts, the media and academic freedoms. Orbán told MEPs before the vote that ‘you are 
not going to condemn a government, but a country as well as a nation. You are going to 
denounce Hungary that has been a member of the family of Christian nations for a thousand 
years’.76   
 
                                                 
73 The EU has shown itself to be incapable of controlling its own external borders. Frontex has only 700 
employees, rising to 2,000 in 2021; https://frontex.europa.eu/faq/key-facts. Accessed 14 March 2020. 
74 Katya Adler (2015) Brand Merkel comes under pressure over migrants, BBC News, 15 October. 
75 Jon Rogers (2017) Tusk pens letter to EU leaders BEGGING them to align against UK on Brexit as cracks 
appear, Daily Express, 18 October; Ross Logan (2017) EU’s longest serving foreign minister in SHOCK 
revelation: ‘This could destroy Europe’, Daily Express, 31 October; Joe Barnes (2017) EU to IMPLODE? Italian 
MEP predicts growing bloc of eurosceptism to challenge Brussels, Daily Express, 31 October. 
76 Daniel Boffey (2018) Orbán defiant as EU parliament considers sanctions on Hungary - Populist PM claims his 
country is being punished for not being ‘country of migrants’, Guardian, 11 September. 
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Euroscepticism has now spread to western Europe, in particular Italy, a founding member of 
the EU. Former Italian Deputy Premier Matteo Salvini has said that: ‘People like Juncker have 
ruined Europe and our country… [and the euro] is a ‘crime against humanity’.  
 
1.9 Tension with Russia  
 
Ninth, the EU has been blamed for the tension between Russia and the Ukraine as a result of 
its 2014 ‘Association Agreement’ with the Ukraine, which Russia interpreted as an 
encroachment on its sphere of influence. The Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko  
described the agreement as Ukraine's ‘first but most decisive step’ towards EU membership’.  
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014 was clearly linked to the EU’s overtures towards 
the Ukraine ‒ which Russia regards as being in its own backyard ‒ and the EU’s total 
impotence of response demonstrates what a paper tiger the EU really is when it comes to 
international diplomacy.77  
 
1.10 Massive corruption in the EU  
 
Finally, there is massive corruption in the EU, well illustrated by the fact that the EU’s accounts 
have not been approved for the last 20 years by the EU’s chief auditor in respect of around 
€100bn of expenditures.78  
 
1.11 An empire about to collapse? 
Governed as it is from a centre run by unelected bureaucrats and judges, rather than 
politicians, it is readily apparent that the EU is incapable of reforming itself.79 As an institution 
driven by process rather than outcomes, it is drowning in its own rules and this is stifling 
innovation.80 It should be clear from the above that remaining in the EU is the high-risk 
strategy – not leaving it.  
 
                                                 
77 See David M. Herszenhorn (2017) How the EU broke Ukraine (with help from Russia), Politico, 24 November, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/the-eu-broke-ukraine-with-help-from-russia/. At the very least, the EU is guilty 
of remarkable naivety, although Charles Grant argues that the ‘EU’s failure to predict Russia’s actions does not 
make it responsible for them’ (see Charles Grant (2016) Is the EU to blame for the crisis in Ukraine?, Centre for 
European Reform, 1 June; https://www.cer.eu/insights/eu-blame-crisis-ukraine).  
78 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11209248/EU-auditors-refuse-to-sign-off-more-than-
100billion-of-its-own-spending.html 
79 A current example is the Commission’s attempt to increase the EU budget during the next multi-annual 
financial framework from 2021-2027, despite the loss of the UK’s contribution (Kai Weiss (2018) Brussels still 
refuses to face up to the fiscal reality of Brexit, CAPX, 2 May). 
80 The 2018 EU Withdrawal Act copied 12,000 EU rules and 7,900 statutory instruments onto the UK’s statute 
book. That’s around 270 EU rules and 180 statutory instruments for every year that the UK was a member of 
the EU. 
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Some go further and suggest that the EU shows all the signs of an empire about to collapse.81 
A recent example of this is Professor Gwythian Prins who builds on the model developed by 
US archaeologist Joseph Tainter to explain the collapse of ancient empires like those of Rome, 
Minoa and the Egyptian Old Kingdom.82 Tainter’s model showed that as empires grow they 
need to become more complex and initially there are benefits from this. But inevitably the 
empires become overly complex – there is a dynamic to complexity which cannot easily be 
reversed – with the additional costs of complexity exceeding any additional benefits to such 
an extent that the empires eventually collapse; see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The marginal returns to complexity - overly complex empires eventually collapse 
 
Source: Gwythian Prins (2018) The EU is at clear risk of collapse – and the ‘remainiacs’ just don’t see it, Briefings 
for Brexit, 2 April 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 We should be under no illusion that EU leaders are planning to create a European Empire to take on the US 
and China. During a speech at the London School of Economics on 28 September 2017, Guy Verhofstadt MEP – 
chair of the European Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group and a former prime minister of Belgium – openly 
called for the EU to turn itself into an empire: ‘The world of tomorrow is a world of empires, and only a united 
Europe will play a role of significance’; http://www.lse.ac.uk/Events/2017/09/20170928t1830vLSE/the-future-
of-europe 
82 Joseph Tainter (1988) New Studies in Archaeology, Cambridge University Press. 
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Figure 2: The marginal returns to complexity – the EU superimposed
 
Source: Gwythian Prins (2018) The EU is at clear risk of collapse – and the ‘remainiacs’ just don’t see it, Briefings 
for Brexit, 2 April 
 
Prins applies this model to the EU: see Figure 2.83  He argues that during the first 50 years of 
its life from the Schuman Plan of 1950, the benefits of the various integrationist steps 
outweighed the drawbacks for the promoters of Europe federalism. But from the introduction 
of the euro in 1999, further additional complexity has produced negative marginal gains and 
the EU ‘has been on the slide as its peoples have come to resent … the remorseless imposition 
of the Empire’s rules, regulations and interference’.   
 
He identifies two watersheds: the Dutch rejection of the 2005 European Constitution 
(subsequently reintroduced in the Lisbon Treaty) and the period from 2015, beginning with 
the Greek crisis, continuing with the German backlash against Angela Merkel’s open-door 
immigration policy, the Brexit vote of 2016 and the Italian crisis of 2018, following the election 
of anti-establishment parties in March 2018.  
 
Prins argues that ‘All this evidence of citizen rejection, while the “project” responds with 
further acceleration, has plainly taken the EU into the Zone of Risk of Collapse; and that is 
where now it stands, shakily but defiant, belittling, bullying, hoping to dishearten the British 
in order to deter any other prospective escapees and intent on punishing us for our sovereign 
decision to leave the EU’.   
                                                 
83 Gwythian Prins (2018) The EU is at clear risk of collapse – and the ‘remainiacs’ just don’t see it, Briefings for 
Brexit, 2 April. 
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2. The costs of withdrawing from the EU 
The British people voted to leave the EU on 23 June 2016. It took until 31 January 2020 before 
they did so. It was a long and painful process as a result of the refusal of Remainers in the UK 
parliament and the civil service to accept the democratic decision of the British people.  
 
Of the many insults meted out to those with the temerity to defy the British and European 
establishments, perhaps the most remarkable came from Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, a British 
civil servant and former UK Ambassador to the EU, who drafted Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) which allowed a member state to leave the EU within two years of 
triggering the Article – which the UK did on 29 March 2017. Speaking in the House of Lords 
on 16 January 2018, he believed the UK will eventually ‘come to heel’ and regret its decision 
to leave the EU.84  
 
The terms of the UK’s departure from the EU was based on the Withdrawal Agreement (WA)85 
and Political Declaration (PD)86 accepted on 19 October 2019 and signed on 24 January 2020 
by the UK and EU. The previous day, the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 202087 
which gave legal effect to the WA/PD received Royal Assent. 
The WA deals with five main issues:  
• It covers the terms of the financial settlement (or ‘divorce bill’) that the UK will pay to 
the EU a number of years. 
• A protocol on Northern Ireland setting out customs and regulatory arrangements 
between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. 
• A section on citizens' rights, with an independent monitoring authority (IMA), allowing 
EU nationals in the UK to lodge complaints about the way the government treats them. 
UK nationals and Union citizens, family members who are UK nationals or Union 
                                                 
84 https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2018-01-16/debates/C4415486-F320-4216-A32D-
49EEE467E961/BrexitDealOrNoDeal(EuropeanUnionCommitteeReport) 
85 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community; 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840655/
Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_and_Northern_Ireland_from_the
_European_Union_and_the_European_Atomic_Energy_Community.pdf  
86 Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and 
the United Kingdom; 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840656/
Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Unio
n_and_the_United_Kingdom.pdf 
87 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/1/contents/enacted 
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citizens and family members who are neither of those two shall maintain the right to 
reside in the host state. 
• An arbitration procedure to resolve disputes about the WA, giving a role for the CJEU 
where there is an issue over EU law.  
• There is a transition period until 30 December 2020 to negotiate a new relationship 
with the EU.  During this period, the UK will be subject to EU law, remain in the Single 
Market and the Customs Union, and free of movement of people will continue. The 
Act prevents an extension of this transition period.  
The most important of these are the financial settlement and the Northern Ireland protocol. 
 
2.1 Financial settlement 
The financial settlement has been estimated at around £30 billion by the time the last 
payment has been made in the 2060s.88 The final amount is contingent on future events.  
The financial settlement has four components: 
• During the transition period, the UK will pay into the EU budget and receive funding 
from EU programmes, e.g., structural funding. 
• The EU annual budgets make spending commitments which extend beyond the end 
of the budget period. The UK will contribute to future commitments as at 31 
December 2020. UK recipients will receive funding for the future commitments made 
to them. 
• The UK will pay its share of EU liabilities ‒ outstanding and contingent ‒ at the end of 
2020. The largest component will be the pensions of EU staff. The UK will receive back 
a share of some assets, the largest component being the capital paid into the 
European Investment Bank, but without investment returns. 
• UK contributions to the EU’s international development programmes (e.g., European 
Development Fund, EU Trust Funds and Facility for Refugees in Turkey) will continue 
to be made via the International Development Act 2002.  
 
The financial settlement does not cover payments involved in any future agreements 
between the UK and the EU, such as UK participation in EU programmes related to science 
and innovation. Figure 3 shows that around 75% of the net payments will have been made 
by 2023. 
                                                 
88 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201919/ldselect/ldeucom/7/7.pdf#page=9 
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Figure 3: Estimates of the annual net cost of the financial settlement €bn 
 
Note: * Assumes the UK leaves the EU on 31 January 2020 so the 2020 estimate is 11/12ths of the OBR’s full 
year estimate. 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility (2019) Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March. 
 
2.2 Northern Ireland Protocol 
The aim of the protocol is maintain an open border between Northern Ireland and Republic 
of Ireland, thereby avoiding a so-called ‘hard border’ where customs checks would operate. 
The whole of the UK becomes a single customs territory outside the EU Customs Union, so 
Northern Ireland can be included in any future UK trade deals. However, Northern Ireland 
follows EU Single Market regulations on goods (including the EU valued added tax (VAT) rate) 
and becomes an entry point into the EU Customs Union.  
 
This means that there is both a de jure customs border on the island of Ireland and a de facto 
customs border down the Irish Sea. The UK would collect EU tariffs on goods moving from 
Great Britain to Northern Ireland that are ‘at risk’ of being sold on to the Republic of Ireland. 
The tariffs collected would be remitted to the EU, unless the goods were actually sold in 
Northern Ireland, in which case, the Northern Ireland companies could claim a rebate.  
 
These arrangements will remain in place until either a ‘smart border’ technical solution is 
developed that allows both an open border and independent customs policies between the 
UK and EU or the Northern Ireland Assembly votes to exit from them.89 The Assembly will 
                                                 
89 Devolved government in Northern Ireland was restored after a three-year break as a result of the ‘New 
Decade, New Approach’ agreement (10 January 2020) between the UK and Irish governments and Northern 
Ireland’s political parties. 
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vote by simple majority every four years to continue the arrangements, with the first vote 
occurring at the end of the transition period. If there is sufficient cross-community support, 
the vote will occur every eight years. If, however, the Assembly votes against continuing the 
arrangements, there will be a two year period for the UK and EU to agree to new 
arrangements.   
The protocol will be governed via a Joint Committee with representatives from both the 
European Union and the UK government. 
 
The UK government has proposed a bilateral technology-based border solution (known as  
‘maximum facilitation’or ‘max-fac’)90 similar to that which exists between Sweden and 
Norway (which is not in the EU) as described by Lars Karlsson, a former deputy director of 
Swedish Customs, in his Smart Border 2.0 report for the European parliament.91, 92 This could 
be part of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) or under an exemption for frontier traffic under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the absence of a full FTA, allowing ‘best 
practice and available technology solutions to bear in an environment of trust and regulatory 
compatibility’.  
 
Shanker Singham points out that only 5% of Northern Ireland’s output goes to the Republic93 
and only 1.6% of Irish exports are to Northern Ireland. Only 53 Northern Ireland businesses 
employing more than 250 people export to the Republic and, subject to meeting capability 
and security requirements, these businesses could be given trusted trader status – in respect 
of managing customs declarations and satisfying rules of origin and product standard regimes 
– similar to the existing Authorised Economic Operators (AEO) scheme. They would submit 
the necessary paperwork through a joint platform, declare any duty due (e.g., when rules of 
origin conditions are not met) and report the importer’s address. The consignment would 
then be sealed to cross the border. Any necessary payments of VAT and import or excise 
duties would be made afterwards in, say, monthly returns. The 92% of cross-border 
businesses employing fewer than 50 people would be removed from the border process and 
                                                 
90 The 'maximum facilitation' solution relies on technology to minimise border checks. Declaration and 
clearance procedures would take place in advance, online, away from the border, and surveillance would be 
intelligence-led, rather than old-fashioned random searches. Critics say that the technology to do this would 
not be available for 10 years and further, it would not solve the Irish border question as there would still need 
to be tariff checks. See: Laura Kuenssberg (2019) Brexit - The return of the 'max fac' solution to the Irish 
border, BBC News, 4 February; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47123330 
91 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596828/IPOL_STU(2017)596828_EN.pdf. 
Karlsson reports that arrangements without a physical infrastructure were successfully trialled on the Sweden-
Norway border, but were not adopted because the existing border arrangements were working well and so 
the cost of a new electronic system was not justified. 
92 Switzerland also has an electronic customs clearance system with the EU. See: Adrian Hill (2018) 
Switzerland: A borderline case, Briefings for Britain, 6 April. 
93 Worth £3.4bn p.a., less than 0.1% of the EU’s annual external trade of £3.5trn. 
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would submit simpler quarterly returns. The process would be monitored using electronic or 
bar code tagging, number-plate recognition, secure smartphone apps and GPS tagging.94, 95  
Despite these apparently comprehensive proposals and assertions, some have argued that 
the max-fac proposal will not solve the Irish border question because of the risks to the 
integrity of the Single Market, as well as political risks to the Good Friday Agreement which 
brought peace to Northern Ireland. Peter Foster points out that different product standards 
and tariffs between the north and south of Ireland mean that it would be impossible to 
exempt small and medium-sized businesses (which account for 80% of cross-border trade by 
value) from customs checks, given that many of these businesses feed into bigger business 
supply-chains: ‘Without a small business exemption, it remains extremely difficult to see how 
technology can be used to solve the Irish border question in a way that meets [the] pledge to 
avoid “any” infrastructure or checks. …It is worth noting that this “Smart Border 2.0” would 
still require “mobile control and inspection units” and “technical surveillance” of the border 
using CCTV and number-plate recognition technology. For security and political reasons, this 
is highly problematic’.96 Others argue that trusted trader schemes that allow exemptions from 
daily checks are costly, unwieldy and totally unsuitable in the context of small Irish businesses.  
Dr Katy Hayward from Queen’s University Belfast argues that it would be using a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut or in her words, ‘It would be like putting on a full diving suit with 
oxygen tank and flippers in order to walk through a puddle that one has crossed every day for 
years without so much as a pair of wellies’.97 
 
Michel Barnier dismissed the mac-fac proposal as ‘unrealistic’.98 Yet Nick Timothy, Theresa 
May’s former adviser, argues that max-fac is the only solution that will enable the UK to 
negotiate its own trade deals outside the Customs Union.  Further, by dismissing it, the EU is 
ignoring its own negotiating Guidelines: ‘the unique challenges of Ireland will require flexible 
and imaginative solutions’. He says that the ‘responsibility to find these solutions is not only 
                                                 
94 Shanker Singham (2018) How to fix the Irish border problem, CAPX, 19 March; https://capx.co/how-to-fix-
the-irish-border-problem/ 
95 These technological solutions are standard under the Transport Internationaux Routiers (TIR) system: ‘The 
Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention, 1975) is 
one of the most successful international transport conventions and is so far the only universal Customs transit 
system in existence. To date, it has 73 Contracting Parties, including the European Union. It covers the whole of 
Europe and reaches out to North Africa and the Near and Middle East’. All transit declaration information is 
contained in a single document, the TIR Carnet, as well as electronically in advance using TIR-EPD (Electronic Pre-
Declaration. (https://www.unece.org/tir/welcome.html). 
96 Peter Foster (2018) Why Boris Johnson's 'max-fac' customs plan cannot solve the Irish Border question, Daily 
Telegraph, 9 May. See also Richard North (2018) Brexit: a psychic epidemic, Euroreferendum, 19 April; 
http://eureferendum.com  
97 Katy Hayward (2018) How Not to Fix the Irish Border, Queen’s University Belfast, March; 
https://www.qub.ac.uk/brexit/Brexitfilestore/Filetoupload,814295,en.pdf 
98 George Parker and Jim Pickard (2018) Theresa May invites Conservative MPs to briefings to discuss Brexit, 
Financial Times, 15 May. 
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British but European too’.99 Mr Timothy has hit on the real reason why the EU doesn’t like 
mac-fac. 
  
                                                 
99 Nick Timothy (2018) How Theresa May can get the Brexit she wants – and still keep her party together, Daily 
Telegraph, 9 May. 
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3. Agreeing the terms of the future trading relationship between 
the UK and EU 
The basis for negotiating the future trading relationship between the UK and EU is set out in 
the Political Declaration (§17): 
 
…the Parties agree to develop an ambitious, wide-ranging and balanced economic 
partnership. This partnership will be comprehensive, encompassing a Free Trade 
Agreement, as well as wider sectoral cooperation where it is in the mutual interest of 
both Parties. It will be underpinned by provisions ensuring a level playing field for open 
and fair competition.  …It should facilitate trade and investment between the Parties 
to the extent possible, while respecting the integrity of the Union's Single Market and 
the Customs Union as well as the United Kingdom's internal market, and recognising 
the development of an independent trade policy by the United Kingdom. 
In his New Year good will message to the British people, Michel Barnier, now appointed as EU 
chief negotiator for the future trading relationship, said ‘any free-trade agreement must 
provide for a level playing field on standards, state aid, and tax matters’.100 He reiterated this 
point in a speech in Brussels on 3 February 2020 setting out the EU’s negotiating guidelines.101 
The European Commission published 12 background documents on its website in January 
2020.102 These make clear that the EU wants a: 103 
 
Balanced, ambitious and wide-ranging free trade agreement [with the UK] “insofar as 
there are sufficient guarantees for a level playing field”. 
 
                                                 
100 Michel Barnier’s three wishes for Britain and the EU in 2020 - The European Union's chief negotiator for 
Brexit maps out the path to securing a trade deal within the coming 12 months, by Michel Barnier, Financial 
News, 23 December 2019; https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/michel-barniers-three-wishes-for-britain-and-
the-eu-in-2020-20191223 
101 Statement by Michel Barnier at the presentation of the Commission's proposal for a Council 
recommendation on directives for the negotiation of a new partnership with the UK, Brussels, 3 February 
2020; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_20_185 
See also: Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION authorising the opening of negotiations for a new 
partnership with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Brussels, 3.2.2020 COM(2020) 35 
final; https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-annex-negotiating-directives.pdf 
And: Future EU-UK Partnership: European Commission takes first step to launch negotiations with the United 
Kingdom, press release, Brussels, 3 February 2020; 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_176 
102 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations/negotiating-documents-article-50-negotiations-
united-kingdom_en 
103 Derived from General principles - §5 of European Council guidelines of 29 April 2017, §3,7, 8, 9 and 12 of 
European Council guidelines of 23 March 2018, reported in European Commission Task Force for Relations 
with the United Kingdom, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the future relationship: "Free trade 
agreement", UKTF (2020) 2 – Commission to EU 27,  13 January 2020;   
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/seminar-20200113-fta_en_0.pdf 
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The aim should be to prevent unfair competitive advantage that the UK could enjoy 
through undercutting of levels of protection with respect to, inter alia, competition and 
state aid, tax, social, environment and regulatory measures and practices. 
This will require a combination of substantive rules aligned with EU and international 
standards, adequate mechanisms to ensure effective implementation domestically, 
enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms in the agreement as well as Union 
autonomous remedies, that are all commensurate with the depth and breadth of the 
EU-UK economic connectedness. 
The future partnership should address global challenges, in particular in the areas of 
climate change and sustainable development, as well as cross-border pollution, where 
the Union and the UK should continue close cooperation.  
 
So it is clear that the EU’s key requirement for a future trade relationship with the UK is a 
‘level playing field’. However, a playing field needs to be level at both ends, and the EU 
negotiating guidelines seek to ensure that the playing field is level at the UK’s end, while 
conveniently ignoring the uphill slopes in its own half of the pitch. This amounts to ‘cherry 
picking’ by the EU which UK negotiators should vigorously resist. 
There are twelve critical issues that need to be addressed to ensure a genuine level playing.   
3.1 Goods 
One, goods. The EU Customs Union with its tariff and non-tariff barriers was originally set up 
in the 1950s to protect, in particular, German industry (especially automobiles and 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals), French agriculture and Italian clothes manufacturers. This 
explains the high tariffs on imports of these products shown in Table 1.  
This particularly badly affects UK consumers buying imported goods where there is no 
domestic production. As a simple example of EU tariffs consider oranges: UK consumers have 
to pay a tariff of 16% on imported oranges to protect Mediterranean orange growers from 
cheaper oranges imported from outside the EU from countries, such as South Africa.104 This 
directly harms UK consumers. 
An example of NTBs that the EU likes to use is so-called ‘rules of origin’. For example, in its 
FTA South Korea, the EU will only allow South Korean goods duty-free into the EU Single 
Market if they are accepted as being ‘made in South Korea’ which means that they both satisfy 
EU standards and have a minimum percentage of components that are made in South Korea. 
For cars, this is around 55%. A UK-built car currently has only about 25% of its components 
made in the UK, with the bulk of the other parts coming from Germany, France and Spain. 
                                                 
104 Kevin Dowd (2017) The EU’s thousands of senseless tariffs simply serve to punish the poor, Brexit Central,  
16 September; https://brexitcentral.com/eu-thousands-senseless-tariffs-punish-poor/. Note, the tariff rates 
are subject to frequent changes. 
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This means that a UK-built car would not count as ‘made in the UK’ after Brexit.105 The EU 
could therefore impose a 10% tariff on UK cars if the EU and UK end up trading on WTO terms. 
These cars would also face WTO tariffs if they were imported into other countries on WTO 
terms, which could make them difficult to sell.  
 
The EU wants to continue to have tariff-free and quota-free access for goods to the UK. This 
is because, according to a study by Civitas,  if the UK and EU traded on WTO terms after Brexit, 
EU exporters to the UK would have to pay £12.9bn a year in tariffs to the UK, while UK 
exporters to the EU would only have to pay £5.2bn a year in tariffs.106 The reason for this is 
that the UK buys mainly high-tariff goods from the EU and sells mainly low-tariff goods in 
return, as well as selling less than it buys. The worst affected industry would be car 
manufacturing which would pay £3.9bn in tariffs. The study found that 22 of the EU27 
member states would pay higher net tariffs, with Germany and France paying the most. It is 
clear why the EU wants frictionless access to the UK goods markets.  
 
Nevertheless, Michel Barnier made clear in his speech on 3 February 2020: ‘It is important…to 
understand that, even if we do achieve such a “best-in-class” free trade agreement, it will not 
be “business as usual”. We will have two separate markets instead of one single market. Rules 
of origin and customs formalities will apply between the UK and the EU. Access to the EU 
market will be subject to certification and market authorisation and supervision activities. 
…As a result, goods entering the Union will, for example, be subject to regulatory checks’. This 
would have implications for UK car exports to the EU. 
 
3.2 Services 
Two, services. The EU Single Market is woefully incomplete in terms of services.107 There is 
much less cross-border trade in services compared with goods. The UK is a major producer of 
services, which account for 80% of UK GDP, yet only 5.7% of UK GDP is exported as services 
to the EU.108 Germany is the UK’s biggest buyer of services at £21.2bn (6.7% of total services 
exports), but average UK services exports to the EU27 states is just £4.7bn. The US is the top 
                                                 
105 What would ‘trading on WTO terms’ mean for the UK?, The UK in a Changing Europe, undated; 
https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/What-would-trading-on-WTO-terms-mean-Long-
Guide.pdf 
106 Justin Protts (2016)  Potential post-Brexit tariff costs for EU-UK trade, Civitas, October; 
https://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/potentialpostbrexittariffcostsforeuuktrade.pdf 
107 See David Blake (2019) Why does the EU go on about the ‘integrity’ of the Single Market when it has been 
such a failure?, Briefings for Brexit, 13 August;  https://briefingsforbrexit.com/why-does-the-eu-go-on-about-
the-integrity-of-the-single-market-when-it-has-been-such-a-failure/ 
108 The UK exported £120bn in services to the EU in 2018 and UK GDP in that year was £2.11 trn. Source: 
Statistics on UK-EU trade, p.8, and https://www.statista.com/statistics/281744/gdp-of-the-united-kingdom-uk-
since-2000/. 
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buyer of services at £76.3bn (24.1% of the total). Switzerland, Japan and even Australia, at 
£13.2bn, £7.7bn and £6.8bn, respectively, buy more UK services than the EU average.109 
When it comes to the future agreement on services, the EU does not want to have the 
equivalent EU-wide deal for services as it wants for goods. Instead, it is proposing to allow 
market access under host state rules – on the grounds that ‘the UK will become a third country 
and the [European] Union and the UK will no longer share a common regulatory, supervisory, 
enforcement and judicial framework’.110 So when it comes to goods (where it has a huge trade 
surplus), the EU is presenting itself as a single bloc, yet when it comes to services (where is 
has a significant deficit), it is presenting itself as 27 separate countries and the UK is expected 
to negotiate 27 separate agreements on services. Each of the 27 member states submits its 
own schedule of commitments under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). 
3.3 Capital markets and financial services 
Three, capital markets and financial services. The EU Single Market is even more incomplete 
in terms of capital markets and the UK is Europe’s dominant producer of financial services.  
The ‘passporting’ of financial services111 will end. This is unavoidable since passporting 
requires a common rule book and both parties seek regulatory and decision-making 
autonomy. The alternative proposed by the EU is ‘equivalence’ of regulations with ‘unilateral 
assessments by both sides with no negotiation’.  
The EU’s position is that ‘[b]oth Parties have equivalence frameworks in place that allow them 
to declare each others’ supervisory and regulatory regime equivalent. Parties should start 
assessing equivalence with respect to each other under these existing frameworks as soon as 
possible after the UK’s withdrawal, endeavouring to conclude assessments before the end of 
June 2020. Parties will keep their respective equivalence frameworks under review’. 112   
 
The EU said it will seek to apply the following principles: ‘Equivalence decisions are unilateral 
and discretionary: [this is] relevant for the future relationship, but not subject to negotiations. 
The EU [will] decide on the basis of an assessment and in protection of its own interests. The 
                                                 
109 ‘Brexit Britain is servicing the World’ - latest official figures are revealed, Facts4eu, February 2020; 
https://facts4eu.org/news/2020_feb_UK_services_the_world 
110 §8 of European Council guidelines of 23 March 2018, reported in European Commission Task Force for 
Relations with the United Kingdom, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the future relationship: "Free 
trade agreement", UKTF (2020) 2 – Commission to EU 27, 13 January 2020;   
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/seminar-20200113-fta_en_0.pdf 
111 So long as a financial institution is regulated in one member state, it can offer financial services in any other 
member state - in the same way an EU citizen can visit any other member state so long as they show their 
passport. 
112 §§35-37 Political Declaration, reported in European Commission Task Force for Relations with the United 
Kingdom, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the future relationship: "Free trade agreement", UKTF 
(2020) 2 – Commission to EU 27, 13 January 2020;   https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/seminar-20200113-fta_en_0.pdf 
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EU’s autonomy on equivalence [is] not to be restricted by the Free Trade Agreement Process. 
[There are] around 40 equivalence areas. Most equivalence decisions deliver prudential 
benefits, some provide for burden reduction and some can lead to market access. All areas 
[will] be assessed. The best endeavour [is] to finalise assessments by June 2020.  [The] 
assessment of UK legislation and supervision [will take a] risk-based and proportional 
approach; as for other third countries, the higher the possible impact on EU markets and 
interests, the more granular the assessment’.113  
 
While equivalence is mentioned in the Political Declaration, it is not an acceptable basis for 
operating a financial system, since the EU’s acceptance of ‘equivalence’ can be withdrawn 
unilaterally at short notice.114 Instead, what is needed is a modified version called ‘enhanced 
equivalence’. 115 Unlike the passport regime, where mutual recognition is premised on home 
and host states applying identical rules, the equivalence concept provides for the mutual 
recognition of home state regimes where the home state rules achieves similar high-level 
outcomes to those of the host, rather than a line-by-line comparison. Further, enhanced 
equivalence could not be withdrawn unilaterally at short notice. A tribunal would adjudicate 
on the matter. Enhanced equivalence would then constitute a genuine level playing field 
when it comes to financial services. 
 
3.4 Citizens’ rights 
Four, citizens’ rights. While the EU is concerned to protect the security and the safety of its 
citizens living and working in the UK after Brexit, it has been much less generous to British 
citizens living and working in the EU. It has only agreed to allow British citizens to continue 
working in the member state where they currently have a job, with no guarantee that they 
can work in another country in the EU. This is another example of the EU operating as 
separate countries when it chooses to do so. 
3.5 Mobility of persons 
Five, mobility of persons. The free movement of people (known as ‘natural persons’ in EU 
parlance) is one of the four freedoms of the Single Market. Around 3.5mn EU citizens 
exercised their right to live and work in the UK during the UK’s membership of the EU’s Single 
Market, while around 1mn British people went to work in the rest of the EU. While the vast 
majority of EU workers in the UK have made a valuable contribution to the UK economy – 
                                                 
113 Reported in European Commission Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom, Internal EU27 
preparatory discussions on the future relationship:  
 "Personal data protection (adequacy decisions); Cooperation and equivalence in financial services"( III. 
Equivalence assessments), UKTF (2020) 1 – Commission to EU 27,  10 January 2020;   
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/seminar_20200110_-_data_protection_adequacy_-
_financial_services_en.pdf 
114 The minimum is 30 days. 
115 Barney Reynolds (2017) A Template for Enhanced Equivalence, Politeia, 10 July. 
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often doing jobs British workers refuse to do – they together with immigrants from the rest 
of the world have also added to the strain on the UK’s social and economic infrastructure, in 
particular the health service, schools and transport.  Immigration was an issue in the UK 
Referendum debate.   
The EU accepts that the UK has decided that the principle of free movement of persons 
between the Union and the UK will no longer apply, but then points to the Political Declaration 
which states that ‘the Parties should establish mobility arrangements, …based on non-
discrimination between the Union's Member States and full reciprocity. … The Parties also 
agree to consider addressing social security coordination in the light of future movement of 
persons. …Those commitments should not be nullified by the right of either Party to apply 
their respective laws, regulations and requirements regarding entry, stay and work’.116 This 
looks like the EU is trying to re-establish free movement by the back door and this would put 
EU citizens in a privileged position relative the citizens of other countries, including 
Commonwealth countries, who would be subject to the UK’s new points-based immigration 
system.117 
                                                 
116 §§48-49 (IX. MOBILITY) of the Political Declaration. See also European Commission Task Force for Relations 
with the United Kingdom, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the future relationship:   
 "Mobility of persons", UKTF (2020) 10 – Commission to EU 27,  20 January 2020;   
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/seminar-20200120-mobility_en.pdf 
117A total of 70 points is required to be eligible to apply for immigration into the UK; some characteristics are 
tradeable:   
Characteristics Tradeable Points 
Offer of job by approved sponsor No 20 
Job at appropriate skill level No 20 
Speaks English at required level No 10 
Salary of £20,480 (minimum) – £23,039 Yes 0 
Salary of £23,040 – £25,599 Yes 10 
Salary of £25,600 or above Yes 20 
Job in a shortage occupation (as designated by the MAC) Yes 20 
Education qualification: PhD in subject relevant to the job Yes 10 
Education qualification: PhD in a STEM subject relevant to the job Yes 20 
Notes: MAC ‒ Migration Advisory Committee, STEM subjects - science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics. 
Source: The UK's points-based immigration system: policy statement, Home Office, 19 February 2020; 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uks-points-based-immigration-system-policy-
statement/the-uks-points-based-immigration-system-policy-statement  
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3.6 Fishing 
Six, fishing.  The EU wants to maintain access to UK fishing grounds on the same terms as it 
has now: ‘In the overall context of the FTA, existing reciprocal access to fishing waters and 
resources should be maintained’.118 Mr Barnier says he wants to ‘avoid economic dislocation 
for Union fishermen that have traditionally fished in the United Kingdom waters’.  
Again, this shows the asymmetry of treatment with other activities.  The UK could not walk 
into a German factory or a French vineyard and take away cars and wine in the way that the 
EU can come and take UK fish. The EU says: ‘A non-member of the Union…cannot have the 
same rights and enjoy the same benefits as a member’.119 The same must apply to the EU in 
terms of our fishing grounds. To paraphrase the EU’s own proposals, the UK ‘will preserve its 
autonomy as regards its decision-making, which excludes participation of the European Union 
as a third-country in UK fishing grounds’. The UK must re-establish the sovereign control, as 
an independent coastal state, over all waters and marine resources in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone that Edward Heath cavalierly gave away to the EU in 1973 when we joined the European 
Economic Community. Barnier did not care greatly for the British fishing jobs that were lost 
when Heath did this. 
3.7 State aid 
Seven, state aid. The EU seeks the ‘application of EU state aid rules to and in the UK’.120 It 
wants ‘anticompetitive conduct and concentrations of undertakings that threaten to distort 
competition to be prohibited unless remedied’ and ‘state-owned enterprises, designated 
monopolies and enterprises granted special rights or privileges must not distort competition 
or create barriers to trade and investment’. It wants to see the establishment in the UK of an 
independent enforcement authority that ‘will work in close co-operation with the [European] 
Commission’ to oversee its state aid decisions.  
However, the UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, wants discussions over state aid with the EU 
to be between ‘sovereign equals’ and says that Brexit will make it easier for the government 
to help UK firms in difficulties.  The EU says it will use Johnson’s support in January 2020 for 
UK regional airline Flybe in the form a deferral of the payment of air passenger duty and a 
possible £100mn loan ‒ and other examples, such as Theresa May’s letter of reassurance to 
                                                 
118 §8 of European Council guidelines of 23 March 2018, reproduced in European Commission Task Force for 
Relations with the United Kingdom, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the future relationship: 
"Fisheries", UKTF (2020) 3 – Commission to EU 27,  14 January 2020;   
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/seminar-20200113-fta_en_0.pdf 
119 §7 of European Council guidelines of 23 March 2018, reproduced in European Commission Task Force for 
Relations with the United Kingdom, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the future relationship: "Law 
enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters", UKTF (2020) 7 – Commission to EU 27,  16 January 
2020;   https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/seminar-20200116-lawenf_en.pdf 
120 European Commission Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom, Internal EU27 preparatory 
discussions on the future relationship: "Level playing field", UKTF (2020) 4 – Commission to EU 27, 14 January 
2020 (II. Competition –State-owned enterprises: Substantive Rules);   
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/seminar-20200114-lpf_en.pdf 
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Nissan after the 2016 Referendum ‒ to put pressure on UK negotiators fall in line with EU 
rules.121 This is despite the fact that in September 2019, the German government gave a 
€380mn loan to German carrier Condor after the collapse of its British owner Thomas Cook, 
a company which the UK government did not bail out.122 Further, UK state aid levels are 
already amongst the lowest in Europe. UK state aid is 0.38% of GDP, compared with 0.78% in 
France and 1.31% in Germany. The UK could therefore increase state aid significantly without 
breaking EU rules.  In addition, key EU member states have had significantly more 
infringement actions taken against them (29 in France, 45 in Italy, and 67 in Germany) than 
the UK (4) in the last 21 years.123 Of the European Commission's 310 state aid decisions made 
in 2019, 47 related to Germany, 45 to Belgium, 35 to Italy, 33 to France, and just 10 to the UK, 
despite being the EU’s second-largest economy at the time.124 In response to the coronavirus 
outbreak, the UK government offered UK businesses £32bn in grants and tax relief and 
£330bn in government-backed loans, whereas the German government offered aid worth 
€550bn to German businesses.125 
More significantly, the EU is very adept at disguising its state aid. One example of this is the 
way in which it bails out its insolvent banks in defiance of its own rules.  Under the EU’s Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD),126 when a bank is ‘failing or likely to fail’, the 
resolution authority (the Single Resolution Board, SRB) has the power to ensure shareholders 
and creditors of the bank bear losses equivalent to 8% of the bank’s liabilities, through a bail-
in.  If public money is used to bail-out the bank, then an immediate 8% write-down of equity 
or conversion of (junior and then senior) debt into equity is required as a matter of law, prior 
to any other resolution steps being taken. However, this requirement is routinely ignored.  
Here are some examples.  In Italy, the SRB took the view that the BRRD and the 8% rule did 
not need to be applied because the failure of  Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A  and Veneto 
Banca S.p.A. was not expected to have a significant adverse impact on financial stability and 
neither bank provided critical functions.127 In Greece, the resolutions were rushed through 
before the 8% write-down rule came into effect and local legislation was re-written to 
prioritise Greek government debt.128 The Cyprus Cooperative Bank Ltd was recently resolved 
with an overt avoidance of the application BRRD on the purported basis that its resolution 
                                                 
121 James Crisp (2020) EU will use Flybe bailout to heap pressure on UK Brexit negotiators, Daily 
Telegraph, 16 January. In the event, this failed to save Flybe which went into insolvency on 5 March 2020. 
122 Tobias Buck and Alice Hancock (2019) Germany agrees to back Thomas Cook’s Condor with bridge loan, 
Financial Times, 24 September. 
123 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-in-greenwich-3-february-2020 
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Facts4EU.Org, 27 February 2020; https://facts4eu.org/news/2020_feb_lpf_brexit_facts 
125 Anna Mikhailova and Tom Rees (2020) Big businesses will need bail-out, says Lord Darling, Daily Telegraph, 
14 March; Jenna Brown (2020) Chancellor announces £330bn of government-backed loans in coronavirus fight 
Professional Adviser, 17 March. 
126 Directive 2014/59/EU. 
127 SRB (2017) Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its executive session of 23 June 2017 concerning the 
assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A., non-confidential 
version, (SRB/EES/2017/12) and SRB (2017) Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its executive session of 
23 June 2017 concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A., 
non-confidential version, (SRB/EES/2017/11). 
128 World Bank (2016) Bank resolution and bail-in in the EU: selected case studies pre and post BRRD (English).  
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involved a continuation of steps taken before the law came into force ‒ which is not an 
approach generally recognised as legitimate in law.129 In December 2019, the European 
Commission approved a €3.6bn package of restructuring aid for German state-owned bank 
NordLB, which was stated not to breach the 8% rule on the basis that private investors would, 
the EU determined, have accepted similar terms, so declared that no state aid was provided. 
Another example is the European Investment Fund (EIF) which is part of the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) Group. The EIB describes itself as ‘the lending arm of the European 
Union’.130  Established in 1958, with EU member states as shareholders, the EIB makes loans 
for the purpose of promoting European integration and social cohesion.  The EIF was 
established in 1994 to provide finance for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs, 
including microfinance) in order to ‘foster EU objectives in support of entrepreneurship, 
growth, innovation, research and development, and employment’.131  It does not lend money 
to SMEs directly.  Instead, it provides finance through private banks and funds, principally 
through venture capital and in guaranteeing loans. Under current Basel Rules, there is a 
minimum of 7% ‘Common Equity Tier 1 Capital’ (CET1) requirement for banks. Since the EIF is 
not a bank, it is not required to have regulatory capital. That ability allows the EIB to leverage 
its on-balance sheet capital under the Basel Rules Leverage Ratio by a factor of 20, enabling 
the EIF to lend €500bn with negligible regulatory capital. This plus the loan guarantees 
constitute huge levels of state aid that are not reported in official EU figures. 
Yet another example relates to fishing subsidies, as Shanker Singham points out: ‘Subsidies 
are especially pernicious as they artificially increase fishing above sustainable levels.  We 
should factor this into our access negotiations. Many EU member states, especially Spain and 
France have very large subsidies to fish in other people’s waters (and not their own – a real 
beggar thy neighbour policy if ever there was one). To the extent that this creates an unlevel 
playing field for UK fishermen, we should factor that into the negotiations’.132 
Finally, it is important to understand the insidious long-term consequences of the EU’s state 
aid rules, as lawyer James Webber explains: ‘Over time, the reach of the state aid rules has 
expanded significantly. State aid includes not just bail-outs of heavy industry and operating 
subsidies to state-owned airlines. It is the main tool the European Commission has – directly 
rather than via legislation – to regulate bank resolution; control tax competition; 
environmental policy; control infrastructure spending. The single unifying factor driving this 
expansion has been the fact that the rules give executive power to the European Commission. 
…[It explains] why state aid plays such a prominent role in the EU’s often repeated demands 
                                                 
129 See European Commission press release, ‘State aid:  Commission approves aid for financing the orderly 
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for a “level playing field” from the UK. If the EU can get the UK to accept their state aid rules 
– the European Commission and CJEU will retain control over much UK fiscal decision making 
and control the ability of the UK to compete against the EU going forward. Whatever the 
merits of subsidisation as a policy choice, the UK Government should be concerned about 
state aid for the same reason’.133 
 
Of particular relevance in this context is the Northern Ireland Protocol to the European Union 
(Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020.134 It could be used by the EU to influence state aid in Great 
Britain by claiming that it infringes EU state aid rules as they apply to Northern Ireland. An 
example would be a subsidy to Nissan in Sunderland on the grounds that Nissan cars produced 
there could cross the Northern Irish border into the Republic of Ireland.135   
3.14 Taxation 
Eight, taxation. The EU also seeks a level playing field in taxation. Indeed, it wishes the UK to 
align its tax regime to that of the EU and to ‘curb harmful tax measures, notably by ensuring 
the UK reaffirms its commitment to the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation’.136,137  
There are legitimate concerns about tax havens and unfair and distortionary taxes. One 
current example is Ireland’s use of corporate tax to become, in effect, the EU’s tax haven for 
multinational companies. Ireland has a corporate tax rate of just 12.5% and has used this to 
attract US tech companies which have since 2014 been moving their intellectual property 
assets there. Corporate tax revenues in Ireland rose from €4bn in 2014 to €10.9bn in 2019. 
However, Ireland has faced an international backlash for enabling multinationals to avoid 
paying their fair share of tax. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel prize-winning economist, accused 
Ireland of being a ‘bad neighbour who stole other countries’ tax dollars’.138 
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Another example – and one that is closely related to the previous one ‒ is a digital services 
tax. From April 2020, the UK government said it will introduce a new 2% tax on the revenues 
(in excess of £25m) of search engines, social media platforms and online marketplaces, such 
as Facebook, Amazon, Google and ebay, which derive value from UK users. The government’s 
argument is that the ‘application of the current corporate tax rules to businesses operating in 
the digital economy has led to a misalignment between the place where profits are taxed and 
the place where value is created. …Under the current international tax framework, the value 
a business derives from user participation is not taken into account when allocating the profits 
of a business between different countries. This measure will ensure large multinational 
businesses make a fair contribution to supporting vital public services’. The UK government 
‘strongly supports G7, G20 and OECD discussions on the different proposals for reform. The 
government is committed to dis-applying the Digital Services Tax once an appropriate 
international solution is in place’.139  Despite this, there was a hostile response from the US. 
According to the Financial Times, ‘the US claims a tech levy unfairly discriminates against 
American companies. …The UK and US were on a collision course over digital tax after 
Washington threatened retaliatory tariffs if the British government did not back down on 
plans to impose the levy from April’.140  
The reform of corporate tax rules – and dealing with tax havens and unfair and distortionary 
taxes ‒ is on the agenda across all advanced economies – and is clearly highly controversial, 
as the issue of digital services taxation makes clear. But this is a fundamentally different issue 
from what the EU proposes.  The EU has some of the highest tax rates in the world, especially 
corporate taxes – see Figure 4. It needs these high taxes to fund its generous state welfare 
and pension system and to support its economic model which involves significant state 
regulation and direction of economic activities.  
The EU has an innate aversion to what they describe as our ‘Anglo-Saxon’ free markets model 
– because of the risk that the markets disrupt its well-laid plans.141 It would be completely 
unacceptable for the EU to try and impose its social-economic model – with its requirement 
for high personal and corporate taxes ‒ on the UK as part of a FTA. In the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ free 
markets world, taxes are used to provide incentives to companies and individuals. For 
example, low corporate taxes provide incentives for companies to invest which increases the 
productivity of their workers which raises both output and salaries – which in turn raises more 
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tax revenues. It is entirely wrong to describe this as unfair taxation, unless, of course, you are 
talking about Ireland.  
Figure 4: Corporate tax rates across Europe 
 
Source: Daily Telegraph 
The EU is also quite happy to use tax incentives when it suits it, as, for example, when French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy offered UK bankers long-term tax breaks to tempt them to move to 
Paris.142  
3.15 Standards and regulations 
Nine, standards and regulations. The UK can correctly argue that it already has high social and 
environmental standards and low levels of state aid. For example, the UK has higher 
standards than the EU minima in most areas of social policy, e.g., it has 39 weeks paid 
maternity leave compared with 14 weeks in the EU, and it has one of the highest minimum 
wages, whereas some EU states have no minimum wage. But the EU is concerned that the UK 
will become a low tax, low regulation, ultra-competitive ‘Singapore-on-Thames’. So it wants 
the UK to adopt both its labour and social protection standards and its environmental 
standards after Brexit. It also wants ‘dynamic alignment’, so that the UK adopts all future 
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changes in standards introduced by the EU, despite being an independent sovereign state 
which has no say on what new standards are introduced. 
In terms of the former, the EU seeks ‘non-regression from common standards in place at the 
end of the transition period in labour and social protection in relation to at least: fundamental 
rights at work, occupational health and safety, including the precautionary principle, fair 
working conditions and employment standards, information and consultation rights at 
company level and restructuring, and protection and promotion of social dialogue on labour 
matters among workers and employers, and their respective organisations, and 
governments’. It wants the UK to impose an ‘effective system of labour inspections, 
[including] administrative and judicial proceedings, [and a] dispute settlement 
[arrangement]’.143  
 
In terms of the latter, it seeks ‘non-regression from common standards, …taking into account 
that the EU and UK share a common biosphere in relation to cross-border pollution, …[and] 
respect of principles such as the precautionary principle and the “polluter pays” principle’.144  
This is another example of the EU wanting the UK to adopt its labour and social model after 
Brexit ‒ something which no other country has accepted in a trade agreement with the EU. 
The reason why no other country has accepted this is very clear. The EU’s model makes firms 
reluctant to take on workers, since it is very difficult to fire them in a downturn and, hence, 
leads to some of the highest unemployment rates in all developed countries. Across the EU, 
the unemployment rate is 6.3%, while it is 7.5% in the Eurozone (EZ). It is 16.6% in Greece, 
13.9% in Spain, 9.7% in Italy, 8.6% in France, and 7.7% in Cyprus. This compares with 2.5% in 
Switzerland, 2.2% in Japan, 3.5% in the US and 3.8% in the UK. Within the EU, only the 
Netherlands at 3.2% and Germany at 3.1% have comparable low figures.145 
The rate of youth unemployment is considerably worse. Across the EU, the unemployment 
rate amongst young people is 14.3%, while it is 15.6% in the Eurozone. It is 35.6% in Greece, 
32.1% in Spain, 28.6% in Italy, 18.9% in France, and 17.2% in Cyprus. This compares with 2.4% 
in Switzerland, 3.8% in Japan, 8.1% in the US and 11.4% in the UK. Even Netherlands at 6.7% 
and Germany at 5.9% have a significant problem with youth unemployment.146  
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The UK already has significant problems of its own with youth unemployment – due largely 
to poor educational attainment, skills and motivation. UK employers have dealt with problem 
by ignoring it and instead recruited low-wage workers from the poorer parts of the EU.147 
Post-Brexit, much more needs to be done to get our young workers into meaningful well-paid 
jobs.  The last way to do this is keep the EU’s labour and social model – and end up with levels 
of unemployment that is devastating the EU’s next generation. 
In terms of the environment, the ‘polluter pays’ principle ‒ those who produce pollution 
should bear the costs of cleaning up the environment ‒ is now standard in international 
agreements and is part of a wider set of principles dealing with sustainable development 
worldwide and originating in the 1992 Rio Declaration.148 But that is the point – it is an 
international standard. The UK is willing to adopt the highest international standards on the 
environment – and indeed other matters – but not have these monitored and enforced by 
the EU – which it what it seeks in the negotiations. Indeed, Barnier’s concerns about the 
environment are a sham, according to Ambrose Evans-Pritchard. He provides two striking 
examples: the Naples mafia (Camorra), which for decades has been dumping toxic waste on 
the lower slopes of Mount Vesuvius poisoning the local water supply, has turned illegal 
dumping into a global business by linking up with criminal gangs in the Balkans and China; and 
the German state of North-Rhine Westphalia opened a new coal-fired power station in 
January 2020, ignoring the UN’s request that no coal plant should ever again be built. The 
polluter is clearly not paying in these cases. The EU’s CO2 emissions have fallen by 23% in the 
EU since 1990, compared with 42% in the UK, following the 2008 Climate Change Act which 
was the first piece of legislation anywhere in the world to enshrine in national law cuts in C02 
emissions.149 
 
Another issue is the EU’s ‘precautionary principle’. This seems on the face of it to be quite 
innocuous, but it is far from being so. It is supposedly there to ‘protect’ consumers and 
prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of product standards. We all welcome safe and reliable 
products. But the EU freely admits that its precautionary principle is used as ‘disguised 
protectionism’ – to protect EU companies and industries from international competition. It is 
also being used to stifle innovation in the science and technology sectors. 
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One key example of this relates to farming as reported by Owen Paterson MP, a former 
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The EU has long opposed genetic 
modification, but it is now putting the same regulatory hurdles on gene-editing. Scientists 
from the University of Minnesota and Calyxt have used a gene-editing method, TALEN, to 
produce a wheat resistant to powdery mildew and therefore in need of less fungicide spray. 
Genetic technologies have reduced pesticide use by 36.9% on average around the world, 
while increasing yields by 21.6%. Yet, these technologies are banned in the EU. Mr Paterson 
argues that the precautionary principle is condemning the EU to be the ‘museum of farming’. 
He says that accepting the EU’s proposals ‘would forfeit the UK’s regulatory independence 
and see it yoked to the EU’s extreme technological risk aversion. We would not be free to 
stimulate our own research centres. We would not be able to recalibrate our regulations to 
focus on outcomes over uniform bureaucracy. We would not be able to improve our 
environmental and animal health standards. We may not even be able to enact the once-
promised ban on live-animal exports’. 150 
3.16 Governance 
 
Ten, governance. The EU is proposing a framework with three components: ‘ongoing 
management/supervision; resolving disagreements through a Joint Committee and dispute 
settlement proceedings; and remedies and compliance, involving financial compensation and 
suspension of the agreement in whole or in part, including across policy areas’. A key EU aim 
is to ‘preserve the autonomy of the EU legal order’.  If there is a dispute with no agreement, 
‘either Party can request: [the] establishment of an arbitration panel [and] referral to the 
CJEU through the arbitration panel’. If the dispute concerns a question of Union law, the 
‘arbitration panel shall refer the question to CJEU for binding ruling.  …Once the CJEU rules 
on the question, the arbitration panel resolves the dispute’.151  
 
This clearly gives the opportunity for the EU to argue that virtually any part of the agreement 
is a ‘question of Union law’ and any dispute must go the CJEU in order to ‘preserve the 
autonomy of the EU legal order’.  The EU can then rely on the ‘purposive’ nature of EU law 
which allows the CJEU  to constantly interpret and reinterpret the wording of EU laws to suit 
the European Commission’s purpose. There would be no legal certainty for the UK if it 
conceded to this governance framework. It is unprecedented in international agreements 
that a dispute between two sovereign bodies is resolved through the courts of one of those 
bodies rather than to international arbitration.  
 
 
                                                 
150 Owen Paterson (2019) Sorry Mr Gove, but Theresa May’s Brexit deal traps Britain in the EU’s failing 
museum of farming, Daily Telegraph, 3 January. 
151 European Commission Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom, Internal EU27 preparatory 
discussions on the future relationship:  “Governance”, UKTF (2020) 9 – Commission to EU 27,  20 January 2020;   
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/seminar-20200120-governance_en.pdf 
40 
 
 
 
3.17 Zero dumping 
 
Eleven, zero dumping. Ursula von der Leyen says the EU is ‘ready to design a new partnership 
with zero tariffs, zero quotas, zero dumping’.152 It is ironic that the new German president of 
the European Commission calls for zero dumping, when her own country is one of the world’s 
biggest dumpers of goods onto world markets. The OECD defines dumping as ‘the practice by 
firms of selling products abroad at below costs or significantly below prices in the home 
market. The former implies predatory pricing; the latter, price discrimination’.153 This 
definition needs to be modified in the case of Eurozone countries to ‘the practice by a country 
of selling products abroad at artificially low prices due to the distorted international value of 
its currency’. 
 
In 2019, Germany had the world’s largest current account surplus ‒ which measures the flow 
of goods, services and investments ‒ $276 billion for the fourth consecutive year.154 The 
explanation for this is the way in which the euro and Eurozone were set up in 1999. Table 4 
shows the weights of the 11 original constituent currencies of the euro.155  
Table 4: Weights of the original 11 constituent currencies of the euro 
Currency FRF ITL ESP NLG BEF IE£ FIM ATS PTE DEM 
Weight 
(%) 
17.47 12.94 5.40 10.53 7.66 4.72 3.22 2.38 1.30 34.38 
Source: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/euro/ 
 
Over a third (34.38%) of the value of the euro is represented by the Deutschmark (DEM). If 
all 11 members were equally productive – as measured by per capita GDP ‒  the particular 
weights would not matter.  But this is not the case. Table 5 shows the average annual 
growth rate in productivity of the 11 members between 1995-2005.156 Germany had the 
second highest productivity growth rate at 1.9%, while Italy and Spain had the lowest at 
0.5% and 0.0%, respectively. 
Table 5: Average annual growth rate in productivity of the original 11 Eurozone members,  
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1995-2005 
Country FR IT ES NL BE IE FI AT PT DE 
Productivity growth 
(%pa) 1.8 0.5 0.0 1.7 NA NA 2.6 1.8 NA 1.9 
Source: Table 1 of Steffen Elstner, Lars P. Feld, and Christoph M. Schmidt (2018) The German Productivity 
Paradox – Facts and Explanations, Ruhr Economic Papers #767, RWI – Leibniz-Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Essen, Germany 
 
This has a very important implication. The low productivity EZ member states pulls down the 
value of the euro on the international currency markets compared with the Deutschmark. In 
other words, the introduction of the euro has completely distorted the market in traded 
goods between the EZ and the ROW.  Germany – and to a lesser extent the Netherlands ‒ has 
been the biggest beneficiary of this distortion. Notwithstanding the high quality of German 
goods, this is equivalent to dumping its artificially low-priced goods onto world markets. This 
especially affects the UK which until Brexit was a convenient captive market for German 
goods.157 
3.18 Sequencing 
Twelve, sequencing. The EU wants to control the sequencing of the negotiations. It wants to 
lock in deals as soon as possible in areas where it has most to gain over the UK – such as 
fishing and financial services – and delay for as long as possible in areas where the UK has 
most to gain – such as (non-financial) services. Having locked in the deals that benefit it most, 
it can then refuse to make concessions in (non-financial) services.  
3.19 The EU’s idea of a level playing field 
The EU’s idea of a level playing field post-Brexit is: 
1. Continue to have tariff-free access to UK markets for its goods (where it has a huge 
trade surplus) and use rules of origin as a bargaining chip. 
2. Impede access to UK services by EU citizens and businesses (where the EU has a 
deficit) by making them subject to home state approval in each member state. 
3. Impede UK financial service exports by making them subject to equivalence approval 
which can be removed at short notice with no negotiation. 
                                                 
157 The evidence for this is in David Blake (2020) The UK is the Eurozone’s Dumping Ground, City University of 
London, March. This study estimates that the euro is undervalued against sterling by between 15.2% and 20% 
(on a purchasing power parity basis), and that had the euro been correctly valued, then Eurozone exports to 
the UK in 2018 would have been lower by between £67.2bn and £88.4bn. 
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4. Treat UK citizens less favourably than EU citizens by restricting their right to work only 
in the member state where they currently work, whereas EU citizens can work in any 
of the UK’s four constituent countries. 
5. Use the new mobility arrangements to re-establish free movement by the back door. 
6. Continue to have access to UK fishing grounds on the same basis as it currently has. 
7. Continue to use state aid – in increasingly disguised forms – to protect its own 
industries, while attempting to block the UK’s use of state aid, despite the UK spending 
less than the EU on average. 
8. Force the UK to align its tax regime to that of the EU where high personal and 
corporate taxes are used to finance its increasingly unaffordable social-economic 
model of high state welfare and pension benefits.158 
9. Force the UK to adopt and keep in dynamic alignment with the EU’s labour and social 
protection standards and its environmental standards after Brexit – whereas these 
standards should either be set by the parliament of an independent sovereign state 
or should be set at an international level and not enforced by the EU. 
10. Adopt a governance framework that gives the CJEU a role in determining disputes 
rather than using international arbitration as is standard in in international 
agreements. 
11. Prevent dumping by the UK, while continuing to dump its products in the UK as result 
of the persistently undervalued euro. 
12. Allow the UK to be disadvantaged by the sequencing of the negotiations. 
In short, the EU wants to maintain the status quo when it comes to activities where it has a 
significant advantage – as a demanding free access to our fishing waters – but it does not 
want to maintain the status quo where it has a trade deficit – as in services and particularly 
financial services.  It also chooses to operate as a single entity when it suits it, while choosing 
to be 27 separate states when it does not. In addition, it wants certain agreements – those 
where it has an advantage that it wants to lock in, such as the fishing agreement – to be 
concluded and ratified as soon as possible – by 1 July 2020.  Yet it wants to keep the 
negotiations on other agreements where the UK has an advantage such as services hanging 
in the air until the end of the negotiating period at the end of 2020. In fact, Mr Barnier believes 
                                                 
158 Angela Merkel once pointed out that the EU has 10% of the world’s population, 25% of the world’s GDP and 
50% of the world’s welfare benefits, implying that even she believed that this was unsustainable in the long 
run. 
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a full trade deal in 2020 is unrealistic, arguing that it would take three years to complete.159 
He will clearly try to push the negotiations into 2021 and beyond, so the EU can force the UK 
to continue paying into the EU Budget.160 Yet Barnier can complete a fishing agreement in a 
few months when he puts his mind to it. 
This is not a level playing field, it is ‘cherry picking’ – something the EU has constantly accused 
the UK of wanting to do and says it will prevent in the Brexit negotiations.161 
3.20 How UK negotiators should respond 
The UK’s negotiators should insist on a genuine level playing field that must: 
 
1. Give the UK the same access to the EU’s service market as the EU wants access to the 
UK goods market, i.e., EU-wide not on a country-by-country basis. Either the EU is a 
trading bloc or it is just a collection of individual states – it cannot be allowed to pick 
and choose when it suits it. 
 
2. Allow the mutual recognition of standards in financial services, e.g., in the form of 
enhanced equivalence. 
 
3. Treat EU and UK citizens equally when it comes to work in the UK and across the EU 
respectively. 
 
4. Treat EU and ROW citizens equally when it comes to mobility arrangements. 
 
5. Treat the UK’s fish stocks symmetrically with the produce of German factories and 
French farms, etc. 
 
6. Ensure full mutual transparency concerning state aid, based on WTO commitments, 
as initially proposed by Boris Johnson in a statement on 29 November 2019. James 
Webber argues that this is sensible for three reasons: ‘first, it is the only other multi 
or plurilateral system of subsidy control; second, the legal terms (and hence concepts) 
                                                 
159 Michel Barnier: Full UK-EU trade deal in 2020 is ‘unrealistic’, Euronews, 15 January 2020; 
https://www.euronews.com/2020/01/09/michel-barnier-full-uk-eu-trade-deal-in-2020-is-unrealistic. 
Cynthia Kroet (2017) Michel Barnier: EU-UK trade deal could take 3 years, Politico, 24 October; 
https://www.politico.eu/article/michel-barnier-eu-uk-trade-deal-could-take-3-years/ 
160 This strategy has virtually been confirmed by Phil Hogan, the European commissioner for trade, who has 
warned the UK that a full trade deal by the end of the year is ‘just not possible’ and that the EU was ‘certainly’ 
not going to be able to meet Boris Johnson’s ambition of having a comprehensive agreement in place by 31 
December. He also warned Boris Johnson that ‘gamesmanship and brinkmanship are not going to work’, 
reported in Jon Stone (2020) Full Brexit trade deal by end of year ‘just not possible’, EU trade chief says, 
Independent,16 January; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-trade-deal-eu-uk-boris-
johnson-timetable-a9287416.html 
161 ‘No “cherry picking” is one of the General principles – §5 of European Council’s Guidelines of April 2017 and 
§3 and 7-8 of the European Council’s Guidelines of March 2018.  
44 
 
underlying it are distinct from EU state aid; third, the UK will as a signatory to the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) be subject to 
its disciplines in future international trade matters. The SCM Agreement is designed 
to restrain use of subsidies in tradeable goods by authorising WTO members to impose 
tariffs to “countervail” the effect of subsidies given by another WTO member. In most 
cases it is necessary to show that the subsidies caused injury before imposition of 
countervailing tariffs is lawful. The SCM Agreement only covers tradeable goods’.162 
In particular, the UK should legislate to resolve the ambiguity in the Northern Ireland 
Protocol and end any requirement to report state aid in Great Britain to the European 
Commission after the end of transition period. Webber proposes that ‘The safest 
course now for the UK is to strip out EU legal concepts from the forthcoming Free 
Trade Agreement – and to use this as an opportunity to withdraw from the EU state 
aid regime…in favour of a more certain, evidence-based and transparent 
framework’.163  
 
7. Allow for full tax sovereignty, while recognising that dealing with tax havens and unfair 
and distortionary taxes is a matter for international agreement. 
 
8. Allow for full autonomy on standards and regulations, while recognising that goods 
and services entering each other’s markets must conform to local standards, while 
other standards (e.g., on the environment) should be set by international agreement. 
In other words, there is no need for the harmonisation or dynamic alignment of 
standards.  Rather standards should be mutually recognised, with a dispute 
mechanism to assess whether one party’s standards have too far out of line with what 
the other party originally accepted. 
 
9. Allow the agreement to be subject ultimately to international arbitration not the CJEU. 
 
The UK needs to turn Barnier’s level playing field argument completely on its head and make 
it work in the UK’s favour and not against it. This is essential if Boris Johnson wishes to achieve 
the objectives he laid out in his speech in Greenwich on 3 February 2020: ‘There is no need 
for a free trade agreement to involve accepting EU rules on competition policy, subsidies, 
social protection, the environment, or anything similar any more than the EU should be 
obliged to accept UK rules. I hope you’ve got the message by now. We have made our choice: 
we want a comprehensive free trade agreement, similar to Canada’s. But in the very unlikely 
event that we do not succeed, then our trade will have to be based on our existing Withdrawal 
Agreement with the EU’. He also emphasized the ‘need for full legal autonomy, [because] the 
                                                 
162 James Webber (2020) All Change? UK State Aid after Brexit. What Law? Whose Courts?, Politeia, 13 
February; https://www.politeia.co.uk/all-change-uk-state-aid-after-brexit-what-law-what-courts-by-james-
webber/ 
163 Op. cit. 
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reason we do not seek membership or part membership of the Customs Union or alignment 
of any kind, is at least partly that I want this country to be an independent actor and catalyst 
for free trade across the world’.164 The EU removed 98.7% of tariff lines in its trade deal with 
Canada, 99% with Japan and 99.5% with Korea. None of the three countries is required to 
have any dynamic alignment on standards, and commitments on workers’ rights and the 
environment are not enforceable through the arbitration mechanism nor subject to 
sanctions.165 
Clearly a cooperative solution involving a mutually beneficial free trade agreement would be 
preferred, but the UK government must be prepared for the non-cooperative solution of 
trading on WTO terms and use the credible threat of walking away if the EU does not accept 
operating on the level playing field outlined above.166  It is the same strategy that the EU is 
going to take as Guy Verhofstadt, the Belgian MEP who chaired the European Parliament’s 
Brexit Steering Group, has made clear: ‘The UK Government says no to EU standards, a far 
reaching fishery agreement, free movement. But it does want zero tariffs, zero quota and full 
access for the City’. Unless the UK backs down, the trade talks will be ‘very brief’, he said.167 
Others commentators agree with taking a hard-line approach.  For example, economist Harry 
Western, writes: ‘the EU’s extreme posture in recent weeks reflects a basic lack of interest in 
their part in having a free trade deal. Having already got what they wanted in the withdrawal 
agreement in terms of the financial settlement, Northern Irish protocol and citizens’ rights, 
an FTA is only of interest if it comes with all the other things on their wish list, which together 
add up to putting the UK in a position of economic and political servitude. As a result, we 
would propose that the UK start making plans now for EU trade to move to a WTO basis at 
the end of the year, including reducing the costs of adjustment for UK firms by the maximum 
extent using various easements (delayed customs declarations, easier reporting rules etc) and 
laying out plans to help the small number of industries where trade dislocation will be 
considerable’.168  
 
Similarly, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard: ‘The EU’s strategic aim is to compel Britain to swallow 
the Acquis even though much of this legislation is either dysfunctional or incompatible with 
21st Century science and technology. It aims to pin down this country as a legal colony with 
                                                 
164 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-in-greenwich-3-february-2020 
165 Global Vision Briefing, 17 February 2020. 
166 This strategy is explained in detail here: David Blake (2019) Here’s how the next Prime Minister can ensure 
we leave the European Union by 31st October, BrexitCentral, 30 June; https://brexitcentral.com/heres-how-
the-next-prime-minister-can-ensure-we-leave-the-european-union-by-31st-october/ 
167 Brian McGleenon (2020) Guy Verhofstadt threatens the UK as he demands the EU hold ‘very brief’ Brexit 
trade talks, Daily Express, 11 February 2020; https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1241010/guy-
verhofstadt-brexit-uk-eu-trade-talks-fisheries-freedom-of-movement 
168 Harry Western (2020) On the terms being offered, EU deal is not worth it, Briefings for Britain, 3 February; 
https://briefingsforbritain.co.uk/on-the-terms-being-offered-eu-deal-is-not-worth-it/. See also Harry Western 
(2020) The EU isn’t interested in free trade with the UK, just political domination, Briefings for Britain, 20 
February;https://briefingsforbritain.co.uk/eu-isnt-interested-in-free-trade/ 
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no way out later other than the pariah step of treaty abrogation.  …Mr Barnier has put forward 
an extraordinary doctrine, that the UK cannot have a sovereign trade relationship because it 
is too big and because it sits on the EU doorstep. What this really means is that Britain will be 
subject to special punitive terms as an ex-EU member if it opts to be a self-governing state 
under its own laws. …[The EU] is already offering so little in trade talks that the differential 
cost of the WTO option is trivial. …[Y]ou cannot negotiate with these people. Britain should 
forget about a trade deal with Europe and look to the world. …It should pursue a fast-track 
accord with the US, given that Washington wants the same thing and is lavishing us with 
affection’.169 
Figure 5: Barnier’s staircase leading to a Canada-style trade deal 
 
 
Source: Michel Barnier, 2017 
 
The EU confirmed its negotiating guidelines on 27 February 2020.170 In 2017, Michel Barnier 
used a presentation slide – which has become known as ‘Barnier’s staircase’ ‒ showing that 
the logical outcome of the UK’s negotiating red lines was a future trading relationship with 
the EU based the EU’s existing trade deal with Canada, the Comprehensive Economic and 
                                                 
169 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2020) Barnier's environmental and labour demands are a sham: Britain should 
stop trying to negotiate with the EU, Daily Telegraph, 19 February; 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/02/19/barniers-environmental-labour-demands-monstrous-
sham-britain1/ 
170 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/02/25/eu-uk-relations-council-gives-go-
ahead-for-talks-to-start-and-adopts-negotiating-directives/ 
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Trade Agreement (CETA) – see Figure 5. In 2018, the European Council went further and 
proposed a Canada+++ deal.171 Yet the EU’s negotiating guidelines renege on that 
promise.172,173 The EU wants to be able to suspend whatever deal is agreed if the UK ignores 
rulings made by the dispute panel or the CJEU.174 It is also advising member states to refuse 
the ‘mutual recognition agreements’ that are needed to certify UK goods satisfy Single Market 
regulations, despite these being standard in WTO agreements, and the UK has already has 
them in place with major trading partners such as the US, Japan and Canada.175 
 
On 27 February 2020, Michael Gove, chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, announced the UK 
government’s negotiating position in the House of Commons: ‘We want the best possible 
trading relationship with the EU. But in pursuit of a deal, we will not trade away our 
sovereignty. We respect the EU’s sovereignty, autonomy and distinctive legal order and we 
expect them to respect ours. We will not accept nor agree to any obligations where our laws 
are aligned with the EU or the EU’s institutions, including the Court of Justice’. The 
government’s negotiating guidelines show that the government is prepared to walk away 
from trade talks in June unless there is the ‘broad outline’ of a deal in place by then which 
would be ‘rapidly finalised’ by September. The government ‘will not negotiate any 
arrangements in which the UK does not have control of its own laws and political life’, and 
will instead revert to trading with the EU on WTO terms if progress on a comprehensive deal 
cannot be made, instead focussing ‘solely on continuing domestic preparations to exit the 
transition period in an orderly fashion’.176 
 
Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French foreign minister, predicted that the UK and EU are going to ‘rip 
each other apart’ in talks over a future trade deal.177 To illustrate, if there is no agreement on 
                                                 
171 Donald Tusk, then president of the European Council, said: ‘From the very beginning, the EU offer has been 
not just a Canada deal, but a Canada+++ deal. Much further-reaching on trade, on internal security and on 
foreign policy cooperation. This is a true measure of respect and this offer remains in place’. Reported in Owen 
Bennett (2018) Donald Tusk offers UK a Canada-style trade deal in blow for Theresa May's Brexit plan, City 
A.M., 4 October; https://www.cityam.com/donald-tusk-offers-uk-canada-style-trade-deal-blow-theresa/ 
172 On 18 February 2020, the UK prime minister’s press office tweeted ‘In 2017 the EU showed on their own slide 
that a Canada type FTA was the only available relationship for the UK. Now they say it’s not on offer after all. 
@MichelBarnier what’s changed?’; https://twitter.com/Number10press/status/1229893225663602693 
173 Christopher Hope (2020) Boris Johnson team ‘infuriated’ as EU reneges on free trade deal, Daily Telegraph, 
1 February; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/02/01/boris-johnson-infuriated-eu-reneges-free-
trade-deal/ 
174 James Crisp (2020) EU seeks power to suspend any deals it makes with Britain over Brexit, Daily Telegraph, 
10 February; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/02/10/eu-wants-power-freeze-post-brexit-uk-eu-
deals-punishment/ 
175 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2020) EU dashes hopes for Boris bounce, but faces its own slow crisis, 
Daily Telegraph, 23 January; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/01/23/eu-dashes-hopes-boris-
bounce-faces-slow-crisis/ 
176 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/our-future-relationship-with-the-eu-chancellor-of-the-duchy-
of-lancasters-statement-to-parliament 
177 Patrick Wintour (2020) Brexit: Britain and EU 'will rip each other apart' in trade talks, Guardian, 16 
February; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/16/brexit-britain-and-eu-will-rip-each-other-apart-
in-trade-talks 
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fishing, and EU fishing boats are denied access to UK waters, there is a realistic chance that 
French fishermen will blockade the cross-Channel ports. Around 17% of the UK’s trade in 
goods with the EU passes between Dover and Calais. Since the entrance to Calais is only a few 
hundred metres wide, it would take just a couple of trawlers to block the entrance to the 
port.178  
 
  
                                                 
178 Oliver Wright and Bruno Waterfield (2020) Brexit fishing war risks Channel blockade, The Times, 2 March; 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/brexit-fishing-war-risks-channel-blockade-0pfgccs2n 
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4. The future trading relationship between the UK and the rest of 
the world 
The EU itself acknowledges that 90% of future growth in global GDP will be outside the EU.179 
The standard vehicle for exploiting such growth opportunities is a free trade agreement.  
 
The aims of a FTA are to eliminate import tariffs and quotas on an agreed set of goods and 
services that are traded between the signatories to the FTA, and to reduce as far as possible 
non-tariff barriers, such as customs and regulatory procedures, that increase the cost of cross-
border trade. However, standard FTAs focus mainly on goods and have less comprehensive 
coverage of services and, in particular, financial and transport services. 
 
This section considers potential FTAs between the UK and different regions and countries 
around the world post-Brexit.  
 
4.1 Global free trade 
When she was prime minister, Theresa May, said: ‘I want the UK to be the global leader in 
free trade. I think that’s important. I think there genuinely is a real opportunity for us. We 
should be around the world, promoting that message of free trade. Seeing what we can do 
outside [the EU]’.180  
 
A potential model for future FTAs is the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) which has been described as a ‘high quality agreement that uses a superior 
“negative list”181 approach to services liberalisation and includes significant provisions on 
domestic regulation, mutual recognition and electronic commerce, and chapters on 
telecommunications and financial services… CETA gives Canadian service suppliers the best 
market access the EU has ever conceded in an FTA and, in most sectors, Canadian suppliers 
“will be on an equal footing with EU service providers.” …Since Brussels has been willing to 
open services markets to Canada, without the conditions of free movement and EU budget 
contributions it previously demanded of Norway and Switzerland, the UK should be able to 
negotiate a high-quality services agreement with the EU, including reciprocal passporting182 
arrangements if the UK government wanted to keep them’.183 
                                                 
179 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2015-014997&language=EN 
180 James Forsyth and Fraser Nelson (2016) Theresa May: ‘I get so frustrated with Whitehall’, Spectator, 10 
December. 
181 A negative list approach means that countries specifically list which products or services they will maintain 
trade barriers on. If a product is not listed, then no restrictions exist and the product is subject to be traded 
openly. 
182 A ‘passport’ allows (especially financial) service companies the right to offer services in other countries,  
while keeping the vast majority of their staff located in the home country. 
183 Geoff Raby and Andrew Stoler (2016) Britain’s services trade can flourish outside the EU Single Market, City 
A.M., 15 December. 
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More general than this is the Heritage Foundation’s idea of a Global Free Trade Association 
(GFTA) of free economies. GFTA member countries would commit to free market economic 
policies, such as low tariffs and few non-tariff barriers, openness to foreign investment, strong 
adherence to property rights, and regulations that are not overly burdensome on 
businesses.184 
 
Another opportunity, according to Alan Oxley, former ambassador to and chairman of the 
GATT, predecessor to the WTO, is for the UK to ‘lead action in reconstructing the WTO, 
transforming it into a fresh global platform that liberalises global trade in services and 
investment. Taking such a role does not depend on the terms of Brexit. [The UK formally took 
up its independent seat at the WTO on 1 February 2020.185] Regardless of when and how it 
settles with Brussels, it has a place to speak now in the WTO. And an active, influential and 
independent UK voice on global trade and investment is sorely needed there. It has become 
fashionable to opine that the era of globalisation is ending and a retreat to protectionism 
looms. What such commentators overlook is the institutional impediment to a global resort 
to protectionism – and that is the WTO. All major economies are locked into legally-binding 
commitments not to raise tariffs. They can only reverse these measures if they compensate 
other WTO members. The worst that can occur is that further liberalisation stalls’.186  
 
4.2 US-UK free trade deal 
A future FTA between the UK and US would be the UK’s most significant international trade 
agreement.187 The US is the UK’s largest trading and investment partner. In 2018, UK (goods 
and services) exports to the US were $121.5 billion, while imports were $140.4 billion.  In 
2017 (latest data available), the total stock of UK foreign direct investment (FDI) in the US was 
$540.9 billion, while the total stock of US FDI in the UK was $747.6 billion in 2017.188  In 
comparison, the UK’s largest trading partner in the EU is Germany, with exports to of £56.0 
bn and imports from of £78.6 bn in 2018.189 
 
Iain Murray, vice president of strategy at the Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington 
DC, describes how the deal might work: 
 
                                                 
184 Iain Murray (2016) How a US-UK free trade deal could revolutionise world trade, Brexit Central, 22 
December. 
185 The UK, like other EU member states, has always been an independent member of the WTO, but, since 
1973, has allowed the EU to negotiate on its behalf at the WTO. 
186 Alan Oxley (2016) Things move slowly in the WTO – there's a significant leadership opportunity for the UK, 
City A. M., 20 September. 
187 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/united-kingdom/us-uk-trade-agreement-
negotiations 
188 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/united-kingdom# 
189 Statistics on UK-EU trade, House of Commons Briefing Paper Number 7851, 16 December 2019; 
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7851/CBP-7851.pdf 
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A US-UK trade deal could set the stage for a major rethink of trade policy that could 
set the stage for productive liberalisation in the future. [This is because American trade 
deals began to go wrong from the early 1990s:] non-tariff barriers such as regulatory 
requirements became the big issue, so American trade deals started to concentrate on 
those. The way they went about it, however, was very European. It was similar, in fact, 
to the European Union’s “harmonisation” scheme, which aims for every EU member 
country to regulate in more or less the same way. That, of course, resulted in a 
significant increase in the regulatory burden on British business. America’s approach 
was to require similar regulatory reforms from every country with which it negotiated 
trade deals, especially in the areas of environmental and labour standards. As these 
requirements came to dominate trade deals, negotiators dropped “free trade” from 
the deals’ monikers and came to call them “partnerships,” all of them hundreds of 
pages long…  
 
[I]nstead of “harmonisation,” [a] new-style trade deal would include Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRAs), which allow the free flow across borders of goods 
manufactured in accordance with member countries’ different regulatory standards. 
An example is the MRA between Germany and its EU partners that allows the sale in 
Germany of beer not brewed in accordance with the Reinheitsgebot, the country’s 
centuries-old Beer Purity Law. As it happens, Germans quite like the law, so foreign 
beers have not diluted the market noticeably. For German brewers, however, the MRA 
means they can produce beers for export not subject to the law, allowing them to cater 
to different consumer tastes across Europe. MRAs would also lead to regulatory 
competition. If one country’s regulations proved to be clearly superior to another’s, 
then the latter country would have an incentive to change its regulations for the better, 
whether to reduce costs or enhance consumer safety.190  
 
Shanker Singham adds:191 
 
The UK and the US are by far the largest investors in each other’s economies (the US 
accounts for 41 per cent of all foreign direct investment in the UK). They have 
maintained a strong trading relationship for more than two centuries. They have the 
strongest ties of any two countries in defence and intelligence. The UK and the US share 
a foundation in English common law. They have the same economics-based 
approaches to regulation and to competition. 
 
                                                 
190 Iain Murray (2016) How a US-UK free trade deal could revolutionise world trade, Brexit Central, 22 
December.  
191 Shanker Singham (2016) Post Brexit Britain can get a much better US trade deal than the EU's failing TTIP, 
City A.M., 30 August. 
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The UK was the birthplace of the modern free trade movement in the nineteenth 
Century and carried the torch for free trade until it was extinguished by protectionism 
in the rest of Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century. When free trade was 
again embraced after the Second World War, it was the UK and the US that rebuilt the 
global trading system in the form of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
 
This shared approach to the centrality of open trade, competition on merit as an 
organising economic principle, and property rights protection as the key tools to create 
wealth and grow economies is what has bound the nations together, and could be the 
foundation of a high level trade agreement that removes existing tariff barriers, 
eliminates government regulations that damage competition in markets, and better 
protects investors and other property owners’ rights.  
 
James Forsyth argues that, while the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) –  
the proposed free-trade deal between the US and the EU – is dead, it would be relatively 
straightforward for a simple US-UK deal to be negotiated with the Trump administration and 
for Congress to ratify.192  Of particular importance to the City would be a deal that made it 
simpler for a firm authorised in one country to operate in another and for there to be closer 
co-ordination over future regulation.193 
Daniel J. Ikenson and Simon Lester, researchers at the Cato Institute, together with Daniel 
Hannan, former UK Member of the European Parliament and founder of the Initiative for Free 
Trade,194 have proposed what they call the ‘ideal US-UK FTA’.195 It is based on the purest form 
of free trade: ‘Real free traders may consider the notion of an ideal free trade agreement 
oxymoronic. After all, real free traders are most concerned about eliminating domestic 
barriers to trade, whereas trade agreement negotiators consider those same barriers to be 
assets. Free traders seek the removal of domestic barriers, regardless of whether other 
governments promise to do the same; we understand that the primary benefits of trade are 
the imports we obtain, not the exports we give up. The benefits of trade are measured by the 
value of imports that can be purchased for a given unit of exports — the more, the better. 
The benefits of unimpeded access to the wares produced and services provided by people in 
other countries include greater variety, lower prices, more competition, better quality, and 
the innovation that competition inspires’.  
                                                 
192 James Forsyth (2016) Brexit means Britain can benefit from this result, Spectator, November.  See also 
Philip Webster (2016) US result may help May’s cause in Brexit talks, The Times, 11 November. 
193 David Wighton (2017) City’s answer to Brexit lies closer to home, Financial News, 30 January – 5 February. 
194 http://ifreetrade.org/ 
195 Daniel Ikenson, Simon Lester, and Daniel Hannan (2018) The Ideal U.S.-U.K. Free Trade Agreement: A Free 
Trader’s Perspective, Cato Institute and Initiative for Free Trade, 18 September; 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/wtpapers/ideal-us-uk-free-trade-agreement-update.pdf 
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An ‘ideal FTA’ between the UK and US would involve: 
• Zero tariffs on all goods (agricultural commodities, primary industry resources, and 
manufacturing industry goods); 
• Zero discriminatory non-tariff barriers, which means no discrimination by either party 
in the content or exercise of the laws, regulations, or practices affecting the provision 
of services of either party, including no restrictions on the entry of businesspeople in 
the conduct of the provision of business services; 
• Zero restrictions on competition for government procurement; 
• Zero restrictions on foreign direct investment in the economy; 
• Zero restrictions on cross-border data flow; 
• Elimination to the fullest extent possible of impediments to expeditious customs 
clearance procedures for both imports and exports; 
• Preclusion of the adoption of antidumping or safeguard measures between or among 
parties; and 
• Strict prohibitions against the use of non-tariff barriers, such as performance 
requirements, restrictions based on scientifically unsubstantiated public health and 
safety concerns, and restrictions based on national security concerns that fail to meet 
certain minimum standards. 
The authors argue that without the need for the exceptions and carve-outs that are typical in 
many FTAs, the US-UK FTA can be shorter and simpler, and its provisions can be covered in 
only 18 substantive chapters, compared with, say, the 30 for the EU-Canada CETA. 
They accept that this ‘ideal FTA’ ‘may not be the most politically acceptable agreement to the 
polities of the United States and United Kingdom’, since it excludes, for example, specifying 
standards for labour or environmental protection.  
Nevertheless, the authors hope that ‘If the United States and United Kingdom are to obtain 
“first-mover advantages” by authoring the rules of the model 21st Century agreement, they 
will want its potential benefits to be perceived as significant enough to attract new member 
countries – including developing countries – to join. For that to happen, the terms of the 
agreement cannot be so stringent as to preclude the majority of countries from meeting the 
requirements’. However, ‘the prospect of extending membership to countries that have – or 
are perceived to have – weaker commitments to labour rights, environmental protections, 
competition rules, or intellectual property standards will undoubtedly prompt louder calls in 
the United States and the United Kingdom for strict provisions in these areas’. 
The feasibility of a rapid US-UK FTA would depend in large part on the attitude of President 
Donald Trump. He won the 2016 US election based on a campaign of isolationism and anti-
trade rhetoric that was critical of both NATO and the WTO. The head of the Downing Street 
policy board at the time, George Freeman, explained Trump’s position thus: ‘At its heart this 
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is about a broken contract through the failure of globalised market economics to serve the 
interests of domestic workers’.196   
 
Some believe that Trump’s isolationism will help the UK. According to James Forsyth, there 
is: ‘keenness of those around him to cut a quick trade deal with the UK. His team views an 
Anglo-American agreement as a way of showing that they are not anti-trade per se – just 
against deals with low-wage economies that they believe cost American jobs. No one would 
think that a deal with Britain would lead to workers being undercut in Ohio, Michigan and 
Pennsylvania –  three manufacturing-heavy states that swung from the Democrats to Trump. 
The [Trump] administration’s enthusiasm for a deal with the UK, in stark contrast to Barack 
Obama’s “back of the queue” approach, makes it less easy to claim that Brexit will leave 
Britain isolated and alone’.197  
 
Donald Trump’s commerce secretary, Wilbur Ross, confirmed in 2016 that one of Trump’s top 
priorities will be to secure a free trade deal between the US and UK. Trump has extensive 
business and social links to the UK after decades as an investor and wants to embolden the 
‘special relationship’ by lowering barriers between the two countries.198  Ross argued: ‘There 
should be a free trade agreement between us once the UK is on its own.  We're huge trading 
partners with each other and our economies are in many ways more similar to each other 
than either of us is to most of Europe. So there's all the logic in the world for the US and the 
UK to be not only good trading partners, but FTA partners. ….The EU talks a good job on free 
trade, but in fact it practises extreme protectionism’. He added that signing a bilateral deal 
with the UK was likely to be easier than signing an FTA with the rest of the EU and that any 
negotiations would not ‘take a decade’, but would be ‘much shorter’. He also agreed that it 
would be better for US-UK trade relations if the UK were fully out of the Single Market and 
the Customs Union: ‘It gives the potential for a more intimate relationship with us if you're 
out of it. [That's] simply because you can do your own negotiating, you don't need Brussels 
to do it and in fact right now, you're required to have Brussels do it, so that's a qualitative 
change in the relationship, and given the fundamental rapport between the US and the UK, I 
have to believe that could be constructive’. 199 
Fast forward to August 2019, with little progress achieved under Theresa May’s government. 
Following a meeting with new prime minister Boris Johnson at No 10, John Bolton, then 
Trump's national security adviser, again confirmed that the UK would be ‘first in line’ for a 
trade deal, once it had left the EU.200  He said a ‘series of agreements’ could be done on a 
                                                 
196 Cited in Patrick Wintour (2016) Brexit and Trump could leave UK stranded between estranged allies, 
Guardian, 9 November. 
197 James Forsyth (2016) Britain holds the aces in Brexit talks, Spectator, 26 November. 
198 Ben Riley-Smith (2016) Britain will be front of the queue for trade deal with US under Donald Trump's new 
commerce secretary, Daily Telegraph, 17 December. 
199 Kamal Ahmed (2017) Ross backs post-Brexit UK-US trade deal, BBC News, 6 November. 
200 UK 'first in line' for US trade deal, says John Bolton, BBC News, 13 August 2019; 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-49325620 
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‘sector-by-sector’ basis, beginning with an agreement on manufacturing, ‘very quickly, very 
straight-forwardly’. A deal for financial services and agriculture could be agreed later. He said 
there would be enthusiastic bipartisan support in Congress for speedy ratification at each 
stage.  
This approach was supported by participants at an international conference in April 2019 held 
by the Ditchley Foundation. It was chaired by Lord Hill of Oareford, former European 
commissioner for financial stability, financial services and capital markets, and Dr Lawrence 
H. Summers, former US secretary of the Treasury.  Taking part were experts from both sides 
of the Atlantic. They recommended that the UK did not need to seek a full free trade 
agreement. Instead it could get a significant part of the benefits and avoid the pitfalls by 
working piecemeal, focusing on the harmonisation of industries where this would be 
relatively straightforward. Candidate areas were energy, fintech, wealth management, and 
research and development.201 
On 2 March 2020, the UK government published its objectives for the trade negotiations with 
the US: ‘An FTA with the US represents significant opportunities throughout the economy, 
from agriculture to professional services. Potential benefits include better jobs, higher wages, 
more choice and lower prices for all parts of the UK. …The Government’s analysis shows a UK-
US FTA could increase trade between both countries by £15.3 billion in the long run,202 in 
comparison to 2018, and increase UK workers’ wages by £1.8 billion. …Removing trade 
barriers with the US could deliver huge gains, especially for the 30,000 small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) across the UK already trading with the US and open opportunities to 
others. For example, the US currently levies £451 million in tariffs on UK exports each year. 
The world-leading agreement the UK wants will also be geared towards maximising the UK’s 
reach in emerging fields like global data flows and artificial intelligence (AI). Professional 
services, food processing and car manufacturing are among the sectors that could also 
benefit.  …An FTA represents a strategic opportunity to augment and codify our strong trade, 
investment and economic relationships, bringing us closer to our largest bilateral trading 
partner and the world’s economic powerhouse. This agreement should support the further 
development of a close defence industrial partnership between the UK and the US in the 
defence sector, recognising that we are already each other’s most important suppliers of 
imported defence equipment, and that this relationship both supports jobs and investment, 
and delivers world class capabilities to our armed forces as they fight together in defence of 
our national interests. The agreement should reduce barriers to defence sales, in particular 
                                                 
201 The full report of the conference can be found at https://www.ditchley.com/events/past-events/2010-
2019/2019/transatlantic-community-and-global-finance. 
202 This seems relatively low, but as Shanker Singham points out: ‘Typically Treasury departments 
underestimate the benefits of trade agreement by wide margins. The New Zealand government 
underestimated the benefits of the NZ-China FTA by some 500%, and the agreement delivered what it was 
supposed to deliver in five years, in about five months’. See: Shanker Singham (2020) UK Launches US 
Negotiating Objectives, Global Vision, 2 March;  https://globalvisionuk.com/uk-launches-us-negotiating-
objectives/ 
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by encouraging deeper and faster sharing of technology, and encourage investment in each 
other’s industrial base’.203 
However, there were significant hurdles to cross. First, sector-by-sector trade agreements are 
not consistent with WTO rules, which state that FTAs for goods should cover ‘substantially all 
the trade’, which in practice means at least 90%. However, US trade negotiators are of the 
view that WTO rules would be satisfied. 
Second, Boris Johnson, while welcoming a ‘fantastic’ trade deal and a ‘very close, friendly 
relationship with our most important ally’, also recognised there would be a need for 
compromise on both sides.204 He said certain sectors of the UK economy would be excluded 
from any deal, in particular, the National Health Service.205 He also pointed to sectors of the 
US economy that are currently closed to international competition, such as public 
procurement where an ‘America First’ policy operates. Service providers in other sectors, such 
as insurance and architecture, needed regulatory approval in each US state, whereas in the 
UK, there is a single national regulator. He would also like to see shipping and aviation 
cabotage liberalised between both countries: currently ‘a British shipping company cannot 
pick up in New York and set down in Boston’. Some commentators believe that the UK will 
not be given an easy time by US negotiators. For example, Sam Lowe, a senior research fellow 
at the Centre for European Reform, said that ‘If any UK-US trade agreement is ever to 
materialise, the UK will be required to concede on the vast majority of the US’s demands 
…Any free trade agreement with the US that even tangentially references the NHS will 
struggle to get off the ground’. 
Third, Nancy Pelosi, leader of the Democrats in the US House of Representatives, said there 
would be no US-UK trade deal if Brexit damaged the Good Friday peace agreement in 
Northern Ireland.206  
Fourth, the terms of any US-UK trade deal will affect the deal that the EU will agree with the 
UK. According to the Financial Times, ministers have been warned that the UK’s efforts to 
strike a US trade deal after Brexit could ‘severely limit’ Britain’s ability to negotiate a deal with 
                                                 
203 Department for International Trade (2020) UK-US Free Trade Agreement, 2 March; 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/869592/
UK_US_FTA_negotiations.pdf 
204 Sebastian Payne (2019) Johnson says US will need to ‘compromise’ in a trade deal with UK, Financial Times, 
24 August; https://www.ft.com/content/571efd82-c680-11e9-a1f4-3669401ba76f 
205 The Government’s negotiating guidelines of 2 March 2020 reinforce this point: ‘when we are negotiating 
trade agreements, we will protect the National Health Service (NHS). Our objectives reinforce this. The NHS will 
not be on the table. The price the NHS pays for drugs will not be on the table. The services the NHS provides will 
not be on the table. The NHS is not, and never will be, for sale to the private sector, whether overseas or 
domestic’.  
206 Brexit: Nancy Pelosi steps up pressure on UK over Irish border, BBC News, 18 April 2019; 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-47979214 
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both the EU and other third countries.207 The warning comes from a report written by the UK 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) which suggested that US 
pressure on the  UK to relax measures to protect animals, plants and humans from disease, 
pests and contaminants and to allow access to the UK market for US products, such as 
chlorine-washed chicken and hormone-fed beef, would violate EU sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) regulations.208 It said the EU would be concerned about non-compliant goods entering 
its Single Market which, in turn, could lead it to impose a hard border on the island of Ireland.  
 
It added that ‘Any significant movement could have implications for our other [free-trade 
agreements] or export arrangements, which are based on existing standards.  …Weakening 
our SPS regime to accommodate one trade partner could irreparably damage our ability to 
maintain UK animal, plant and public health, and reduce trust in our exports’.  Further, SPS 
policy is a devolved matter in Scotland and Wales, so there is “The potential for [devolved 
administrations] to diverge across the UK on SPS measures could significantly complicate 
future trade negotiations’.  
 
However, DEFRA’s concerns about US food safety standards being lower than those in the EU 
are not borne out by independent scientific evidence. Take, for example, the World Health 
Organisation study Global Estimates and Regional Comparisons of Food-borne Diseases.209 
This reports global food-borne disease incidence, mortality, and disease burden in terms of 
Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), which measures how many illness years (per 100,000 
population) are attributable to disease caused by food. The most frequent causes of food-
borne illness are diarrhoeal disease agents, particularly norovirus and Campylobacter. The 
most frequent causes of food-borne deaths are Salmonella, Taenia solium, hepatitis A virus, 
and aflatoxin. It turns out that the region with the lowest DALY is the USA, Canada and Cuba 
(denoted region AMR A) in the study. Dominated by the US, this region has a DALY of 35 per 
100,000. All three European groups (EUR A, EUR B and EUR C) have DALYs of between 40 and 
50 per 100,000.  Using lab report data for Salmonella and Campylobacter, Professor David 
Paton reports incidences for the US and UK of 15 per 100,000 for both in the US and higher 
rates of 17 and 108 per 100,000, respectively, in the UK.210 
Washing chicken in chlorine to eliminate harmful bacteria is one of a number of anti-microbial 
washes permitted in the US as a pathogen reduction treatment (PRT). The most common 
washes include trisodium phosphate, acidified sodium chlorite, chlorine dioxide, and 
                                                 
207 Jim Pickard (2019) Warning of threat to UK-EU trade deal from US food demands - Defra officials’ paper 
points to pressure to relax food and animal health standards after Brexit, Financial Times, 7 October; 
https://www.ft.com/content/778b2d6c-e830-11e9-a240-3b065ef5fc55 
208 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations are designed to protect humans, animals and plants from 
diseases, pests, or contaminants. See World Trade Organisation (1998) Understanding the WTO Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, May; https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm 
209 https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/199350/9789241565165_eng.pdf 
210 David Paton (2019) Fact Checking the BBC Fact Checkers, Briefings for Brexit, 3 March; 
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58 
 
peroxyacids.211 These washes were banned by the EU’s European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) 
in 1997.  The reason given was concerns about poor hygiene standards in the production 
process: ‘the use of antimicrobial solutions does not replace the need for good hygienic 
practices during processing of poultry carcasses, particularly during handling’. As a 
consequence, US chicken imports to the EU ceased. However, the EFSA accepted in 2005 that 
these washes posed  ‘no safety concern’ over human exposure. 212 Indeed, the chlorine 
washing of bagged salads is permitted in the EU.213 
Yet, far from protecting European consumers, the EFSA allows their food to be injected with 
potentially dangerous additives that are actually banned in the US.214  One example is the 
sweetener Aspartame – used in soft drinks and low-calorie sugar-free foods – which has been 
linked to increased rates of cancer.  Other examples are E104 Quinoline Yellow, E122 
Carmoisine and E124 Ponceau 4R which are synthetic dyes derived from coal tar and used in 
sweets and other foods such as smoked haddock and scotch eggs. They can cause rashes and 
water retention in people allergic to aspirin, as well as hyperactivity in children. Professor Erik 
Millstone, Professor of Science Policy at the University of Sussex, said: ‘Serious avoidable risks 
are being taken with public health and if the public was well informed about it then they 
wouldn’t tolerate it’. 
 
There is nothing in the DEFRA report which prevents a UK-EU trade deal. Just because UK 
consumers buy US products with different standards from EU products does not prevent UK 
producers making products that meet EU standards. UK producers have to meet the 
standards set in all overseas markets that they sell into. Some might only produce products 
that meet the standard of their most profitable market. Further, consumer labelling will 
provide UK consumers with a choice.  If they prefer less expensive US goods, so long as they 
understand what they are buying, they should be free to do so. In any event, the 
Government’s negotiating guidelines make clear that ‘any agreement will ensure high 
standards and protections for consumers and workers, and will not compromise on our high 
environmental protection, animal welfare and food standards’. 
 
This is what free trade agreements are all about: increasing consumer choice and reducing 
the prices consumers pay, and, in addition, not condemning cheaper products as ‘inferior’ 
                                                 
211 Renée Johnson (2015) U.S.-EU Poultry Dispute on the Use of Pathogen Reduction Treatments (PRTs), 
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212 Opinion of the Scientific Panel on food additives, flavourings, processing aids and materials in contact with 
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just because more efficient producers can produce them at lower prices. Liz Truss, the trade 
secretary, says she was ‘proud’ of the UK’s high environmental standards, but she wanted to 
take ‘a much more free-market approach’. 
 
4.3 New Atlantic Growth Pact  
This is a proposal from Kristen Silverberg – who served as US ambassador to the EU from 
2008-09 – and Phil Levy – who was senior economist for trade at the Council of Economic 
Advisers during the George W. Bush administration.215  
 
The New Atlantic Growth Pact would involve the US, the UK and the EU. It would be: 
 
an agreement to remove regulatory barriers to trade, including those in financial 
services, and to spur cross-border investment could help invigorate all three 
economies…. A relaunched trilateral deal [following the stalling of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks] would spur growth. It would also 
provide a framework to address the EU’s qualms about appearing to reward Brexit and 
encouraging other exits. … On the American side, efforts to launch a new trans-Atlantic 
agreement would show that the US remains serious about defending its role in setting 
standards for global trade.  
…The Atlantic Growth Pact could eventually serve as the anchor to bring in other 
countries. The US could spur the new talks by offering a significant new concession—
the willingness to tackle financial services in the negotiations. This would meet a major 
European demand from the TTIP negotiations. It would also provide a unique 
opportunity to address one of the core questions surrounding Brexit—how to avoid a 
costly disruption of the City of London’s role as a centre for international finance. 
Trilateral negotiations would be challenging. In contrast, it would be relatively easy for 
the US and the UK to reach a bilateral agreement, and the US should be prepared to 
pursue bilateral talks if the three-party negotiations fail. But economically and 
diplomatically, a trilateral trans-Atlantic deal has more to offer. The potential costs to 
the US of a Europe left fractured and faltering are very high.  
 
This is another sensible proposal, coming from authors with a free market perspective. The 
problem is how to get the deeply protectionist EU to sign up. 
 
4.4 New Prosperity Zone/Anglosphere/CANZUK 
These are proposals to bring together in a free-trade agreement countries that have the same 
open and cooperative approach to international trade.  
                                                 
215 Kristen Silverberg and Phil Levy (2016) The Benefits of a New Atlantic Growth Pact, Wall Street Journal, 30 
October.    
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Shanker Singham argues that ‘the direction of travel of international trade thinking is towards 
countries recognising each other’s regulatory systems if they achieve the same ultimate goal 
of regulation, even if the underlying regulation differs’.216 As a striking illustration of this, 
Japan and the UK agreed to complete a quick deal on mutual recognition of each other’s 
goods and services standards when the UK left the EU.217 This is in marked contrast to the 
EU’s bureaucratic approach and what Philippe Legrain calls Brexit’s stark trade off with the 
EU: ‘if the UK wants its regulations and standards to diverge from those of the EU, it will 
inevitably suffer a big loss of exports, especially in services, to its main trading partner. To 
have any hope of offsetting those losses, the benefits from deregulation and new trade deals 
with the rest of the world need to be very large indeed.’218   
Singham’s proposal is to create a new Prosperity Zone:219 
What if, instead of making deals on a country-by-country basis, we were to lay the 
foundations for a new Prosperity Zone, bringing together countries around the world 
that believe in free trade and competition? 
 
…The lesson of the [stalled] TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] is that the more countries 
[that] are around the table, the harder a deal is to do. So the founding principle of the 
Prosperity Zone should be that it will not sacrifice quality for quantity. 
 
We should start with countries such as New Zealand, Singapore and Australia, who are 
all committed to free trade and have jettisoned agricultural protectionism (assuming 
in the UK’s case that it will have come out of the Common Agricultural Policy and 
Common Fisheries Policy when it leaves the EU). 
 
This small group could maintain an alignment around the core concepts of economic 
development, open trade, competition and property rights protection. It could also go 
further than TPP by dealing with distortions inside borders – what are termed Anti-
Competitive Market Distortions or ACMDs. 
 
This… would be done not via traditional remedies, such as anti-dumping measures, 
which are damaging to trade and competition, but by disciplining countries that used 
government privileges or benefits to confer a cost advantage on their companies that 
could then increase their market share overseas. 
 
                                                 
216 Shanker Singham (2017) A narrow-minded Brexit is doomed to fail, CAPX, 4 December. 
217 Japan, UK eye post-Brexit mutual recognition of trade standards, Reuters, 15 December 2017. 
218 Philippe Legrain (2017) This government doesn’t understand Brexit’s trade-offs, CAPX, 7 December. 
219 At the time, he was Director of the International Trade and Competition Unit at the Institute of Economic 
Affairs. 
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Such rules would be needed because distortions inside borders are inevitably exported 
– as happened in Port Talbot or Redcar, where local producers went bust as a result of 
distortions in the Chinese steel market. 
 
The initial grouping of countries would have the advantage of being largely open 
economies – the UK, New Zealand, Australia and Singapore can boast the least 
distorted markets in the world. But the platform would be open: other countries, such 
as Switzerland or the members of NAFTA, could be added in future. The ultimate goal 
– even if you started with the most likely partners – would be to include all like-minded 
countries. 
 
Under this vision, the UK would still need to negotiate bilateral FTAs with other major 
trading partners such as India, China and the EU itself. But in each of these cases, we 
must be realistic about what we can achieve. 
 
There are many things that could derail this vision.  Since it depends on the negotiation 
of agreements with a range of countries in goods and services and over domestic 
regulatory issues, remaining within any part of the EU Customs Union, or even 
remaining a member of the European Economic Area, will prevent its realisation. 
 
Far better to negotiate a comprehensive FTA that does not leave our hands tied 
elsewhere – which is why the recent suggestion that the UK would be seeking a “CETA-
plus” deal modelled on arrangements with Canada was so encouraging. 
 
Viewed in this light, the entire Brexit process should be regarded as part of a wide-
ranging exercise – government departments must work together so that we can exit 
the EU in such a fashion that the high-level vision of growth, prosperity and hope can 
remain intact in our negotiations with other countries. 
 
We must also use this opportunity to embrace a regulatory reform agenda at home 
which will eliminate our own domestic distortions and lead to the lowering of prices 
for key staples, such as food and energy. 
 
This is, as we are all aware, a time of uncertainty. But if the process is handled correctly, 
the prospects for the British people are bright indeed.220 
 
                                                 
220 Shanker Singham (2016) Brexit can enrich not just Britain, but the world, CAPX, 13 December. 
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Variations on this are the Anglosphere countries trade deal proposed by Graeme Leach221 and 
a smaller subset of Anglosphere, the CANZUK (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and UK) trade 
deal proposed by Andrew Lilico.222   
 
The Anglosphere consists principally of the US and Commonwealth countries, such as Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and India. 223  It benefits from having a shared language, democratic 
institutions, and similar legal systems, based on common law. It accounts for 33% of global 
GDP, compared with the EU’s 17.7%.224 The former Australian High Commissioner to the UK, 
Alexander Downer, states: ‘We are encouraging the UK and the EU quickly to establish a new, 
mutually beneficial relationship that sustains the economies and global influence of both. We 
are also keen to strike a free trade agreement with the UK. That shouldn’t be too hard to do 
because we are like-minded free traders who know that protectionism makes people poorer 
and costs jobs. Finally, we have another hope: that Britain will continue to recognise that it is 
a global power with global responsibilities, not just a regional player. If it does so, this will 
mean Australia and the UK finding yet more ways to work together and promote the values 
and objectives we share’.225  
 
4.5 The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership  
 
The global economic centre of gravity is moving to the Pacific Rim and the UK needs to be 
fully engaged there if it is to take advantage of the opportunities on offer. There are two main 
trading initiatives in the region.  The first is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 
 
CPTTP is a deep and comprehensive plurilateral Free Trade Agreement between 11 countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region. These countries – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
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Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam – have a combined population of 500m 
people and in 2017 generated 13.4% of global GDP.226 The FTA has not yet come into force. 
The US had signed the CPTPP’s precursor agreement, but later withdrew. Were the US to re-
join, CPTPP coverage of global GDP would be around 40%. Other countries have also 
expressed an interest in signing. 
 
It has been suggested, by Shanker Singham and others, that the UK join CPTPP after Brexit. 
The UK’s Department for International Trade (DIT) has considered the economic benefits of 
joining.227 
 
In 2016, total UK trade with current members of CPTPP accounted for 7% of UK trade, with 
50% of that accounted for by Japan and Canada. Exports were £44 billion and imports £38 
billion. Goods trade – mainly machinery, vehicles, pharmaceutical products and electrical 
machinery – significantly exceeds services trade – mainly financial services, other business 
services and travel services. 
 
The UK already participates in FTAs with Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Japan, Singapore and 
Vietnam via FTAs negotiated by the EU. The UK has also started negotiating bilateral FTAs 
with Australia and New Zealand. The purpose of UK accession to CPTPP would be to deepen 
these trade and investment relationships by allowing British businesses to benefit from 
expanding and deepening global supply chains with a group of diverse economies. 
 
The DIT argues that potential UK membership of CPTPP may provide the opportunity to help 
shape international trade rules in critical and growing areas of trade for the UK economy such 
as data, digital and e-commerce. It could also mean greater integration of the UK’s global 
value chains in the Asia-Pacific region. These, in turn, could increase productivity through 
increased knowledge spill-overs.  
 
There is, however, significant opposition in the UK to participation in CPTTP. The Trades Union 
Congress (TUC), in particular, is opposed ‘due to the significant threats the deal poses to 
workers’ rights, regulatory standards, public services and democratic decision as well as 
putting large numbers of jobs at risk’:228  
 
Particular concerns raised by the TUC are: 
                                                 
226 IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2018. 
227  An information pack for the Consultation relating to the UK potentially seeking accession to the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Department for 
International Trade; 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/745951/
FTA_brochure_CPTPP_FINAL.pdf. This section draws heavily on this document. 
228 Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership: Submission to the Department for International 
Trade, Trades Union Congress; 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/TUC%20CPTPP%20consultation%20final%20response_0.pdf 
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• Workers’ rights at risk  
 
Unions globally have expressed concern that CPTPP contains no mechanism to monitor 
countries’ adherence to core ILO [International Labour Office] standards or whether 
they promote Decent Work.229 The labour chapter has no effective enforceable 
provisions on workers’ rights and no mechanism to ensure that violations of ILO 
standards result in any penalty. This is a particular concern as CPTPP involves countries 
such as Vietnam where the fundamental ILO standard on freedom of association is not 
respected, with independent trade unions forbidden by law.  
 
• Threats to democracy  
 
Workers’ rights ‒ as well as democratic decision making more broadly ‒ is additionally 
undermined by the presence of Investor-State Dispute Settlement in CPTPP. This 
mechanism allows foreign investors to sue governments for regulations or actions that 
they believe threaten their ability to make profits. This mechanism has been used in 
the past to challenge minimum wage laws as well as other rules that affect workers, 
such as those on health and safety. 
 
[According to] Joseph Stiglitz, Noble Laureate in Economics and Professor at Columbia 
University, …‘[TPP] is an agreement to manage its members’ trade and investment 
relations – and to do so on behalf of each country’s most powerful business lobbies. 
Make no mistake:…TPP is not about “free” trade.' 
 
• Threats to jobs and increasing gender inequalities  
 
CPTPP may lead to job losses in some sectors due to increased imports from CPTPP 
countries. Unions are concerned that workers who lose jobs will be forced to take up 
new employment on precarious terms with low pay in the informal sector. As women 
are disproportionately likely to be employed in the informal sector already, any 
increase in the informal economy will increase the disadvantage women suffer in the 
labour market and increase gender wage gaps.  
 
 
 
                                                 
229 According to the ILO’s Decent Work agenda: ‘Decent work sums up the aspirations of people in their 
working lives. It involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the 
workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, 
freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives 
and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men’; https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-
work/lang--en/index.htm 
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• Threats to manufacturing  
 
CPTPP poses threats to jobs in manufacturing sectors as it would make it easier for 
Vietnam to export goods to the UK which could include cheap Chinese steel or other 
manufactured goods such as tyres, cement and glass, deliberately routed through 
Vietnam to avoid trade remedies. The TUC is concerned this would increase the rate of 
trade dumping in UK manufacturing sectors, putting thousands of jobs in steel and 
related supply chains at risk.  
 
• Threats to public services  
 
CPTPP would also expose public services to further privatisation as it takes the 
‘negative list’ approach to service listing. This means that any services not explicitly 
exempted will be opened to further privatisation. Furthermore a ‘ratchet clause’ in 
CPTPP would mean that services already opened to privatisation could not be 
renationalised in the future.  
 
The government’s ability to exempt public services adequately in CPTPP would be 
severely restricted as the UK would be joining an existing agreement it would have very 
little power to alter.  
 
The UK is to seek independent membership of the plurilateral Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA). The key aim of the GPA is to open government 
procurement markets covering goods, services and workers. This also has major 
implications for the freedom of policy choices for the devolved administrations230 who 
have already established devolved powers over public procurement.  
 
Sir David Warren, Associate Fellow of the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, is also 
opposed to UK participation.231  He argues that the UK would be a valuable partner for Japan 
as it tried to bolster Asian multilateralism, but the benefits are not as clear for Britain. CPTPP 
membership would only be feasible if Britain left the EU Customs Union, in which case, the 
UK would ‘lose its status as a “gateway to Europe”…  which has been a powerful incentive for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) – not least from over 1,000 companies from Japan – into the 
UK over the last 40 years. …[It] would jeopardize a level of FDI that has made a major 
contribution to the British economy.  And the balance of advantage is obvious on trade as 
well. Around 8% of British exports go to the 11 countries of the CPTPP; over 40% to the 27 
                                                 
230 In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
231 David Warren (2018) Despite Abe’s Invitation, the CPTPP Does Not Make Sense for Britain, Expert 
Comment, Chatham House - the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 12 October; 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/despite-abe-s-invitation-cptpp-does-not-make-sense-
britain 
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countries of the EU. …It’s hard to escape the conclusion that the idea that CPTPP membership 
might in some way compensate for a looser trade association with the EU is illusory’.  
 
4.6 China’s new Silk Road – ‘One belt-one road’ trade network between Europe and 
Asia 
The second initiative is China’s new Silk Road, the ‘one belt-one road’ trade network between 
Europe and Asia – comprising 65 countries with 29% of global GDP and 64% of the global 
population.  
 
China’s ambassador to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, states that: ‘Britain now is China’s major trading 
partner and investment destination in Europe. The Brexit Referendum has certainly not 
dampened the enthusiasm of Chinese businesses about investing in this country. On the 
contrary, it opens the door to the possibility of exploring a higher level of bilateral trade and 
investment arrangements…London's financial services sector stands to benefit from the 
ongoing internationalisation of the renminbi, if it continues to sell the City as an offshore 
centre for the currency. For China and the UK, renminbi internationalisation is an important 
part of our co-operation in [the] financial sectors. It is an area where we can dovetail 
respective strengths and produce mutual benefits’. He added that as the renminbi (RMB) 
becomes a reserve currency, ‘that will give London a further advantage and allow offshore 
RMB business in London to grow at an even faster speed’.232  
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) reports that the UK did £55bn of trade with China 
in 2016, making it Beijing’s eight biggest global trading partner. The only two non-Asian 
countries to surpass this were the US and Germany, with £386bn and £112bn of trade, 
respectively, in the same year. Guy Dru Drury, head of the CBI’s branch in China, said: ‘The 
Sino-British relationship is a great success story. As we delve deeper into the Golden Era of 
ties between China and the United Kingdom, we have so much to offer each other, and British 
business is keen to play its part. From cars to chemicals, and services to schools, British 
organisations – especially many smaller companies – are tapping into a growing market in 
China, one that plays to the UK’s best competitive strengths. With the consumer market 
worth over £3.3trn, instantly recognisable British products are a particularly strong match for 
a growing generation of affluent Chinese. Moreover, this relationship creates thousands of 
jobs in the UK and China, raising living standards and boosting productivity. As the UK forges 
a new global trading future, it is well ahead of the curve in making the most of its relationship 
with the world’s fastest growing economy. By making inroads into China’s lesser economically 
                                                 
232 Tim Burke (2016) Brexit won’t dampen China’s enthusiasm for UK, says ambassador, Financial News, 11 
October. 
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known regions, the UK stands to profit from China’s move from manufacturing and 
infrastructure into technology and services’.233 
4.7 Comment on the UK’s future trading relationships with the rest of the world 
The UK invented global free trade in the 1840s, following the repeal of the Corn Laws.  Initially, 
the other major economic powers, Germany and the US, joined in – and for a short period in 
the second half of the 19th century, there was tariff-free international trade. 
 
But it did not take long for protectionism to take hold in Germany and the US.  Both came to 
the view that the UK, because it was the first to start the Industrial Revolution in 1760, it had 
a competitive advantage over them. They both appealed to their governments to impose 
tariffs on British imports to protect their ‘infant industries’.  
 
The German view was that global free trade ‘proved in the first place to be an exceptional 
means of establishing and preserving British world domination. At the moment this system 
reached its peak, the English had developed their industry most. They went into the race with 
the largest cost advantages. Because they also possessed the largest merchant marine and 
navy in the world, they could tune in to the great circuit of world trade in such a way that 
their economic and political power grew proportionately. Every intensification of traffic in 
goods created new profits. The whole world worked in English money and the English were 
the bankers, the manufacturers, the traders, the carriers and, last not least, the policemen of 
the world’.234  The Germans began a Customs Union in 1843 which broke down trade barriers 
between the disparate German principalities.  This led to rapid economic growth amongst the 
principalities and to eventual unification of Germany under Bismarck in 1871. US 
industrialists, like Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, took a similar view and grew very 
rich behind the trade barriers they encouraged the US government to impose following the 
end of the US civil war in 1865. 
 
Since then, Germany and the US have been big supporters of regional trading blocs involving 
a customs union protected by trade barriers. Germany was the driving force behind the 
establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 which became the European 
Union in 1993.235 Similarly, the US initiated the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) which came into effect in 1994 under Bill Clinton, but was first proposed by Ronald 
                                                 
233 Nick Gutteridge (2017) ‘Ahead of the curve’ British trade with global giant China booms as rest of EU lags 
behind, Daily Express, 3 November. 
234 Walther Funk cited in David Blake (2019) Striking similarities: The origins of the European Economic 
Community, Briefings for Brexit, 20 May; https://briefingsforbrexit.com/striking-similarities-the-origins-of-the-
european-economic-community/ 
235 See David Blake (2019) Striking similarities: The origins of the European Economic Community, Briefings for 
Brexit, 20 May; https://briefingsforbrexit.com/striking-similarities-the-origins-of-the-european-economic-
community/ 
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Reagan. The protectionist President Donald Trump said that NAFTA was bad for US jobs and 
insisted it was replaced by the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2018.  
 
Given this recent history, it will be challenging to reduce barriers to trade, although that is the 
WTO’s mission statement: ‘The WTO is the international organisation whose primary purpose 
is to open trade for the benefit of all’.236  
 
Yet as the WTO and World Bank recognises, trade is the best way to escape from poverty and 
to boost prosperity:237 
 
A dramatic increase in developing country participation in trade has coincided with an 
equally sharp decline in extreme poverty worldwide. Developing countries now 
constitute 48 percent of world trade, up from 33 percent in 2000, and the number of 
people living in extreme poverty has been cut in half since 1990, to just under one 
billion people. Trade has helped increase the number and quality of jobs in developing 
countries, stimulated economic growth, and driven productivity increases. 
But for the World Bank Group to achieve its Twin Goals of ending extreme poverty and 
boosting shared prosperity, the benefits of trade must be extended to the poorest and 
most vulnerable.  This, in turn, requires a concerted effort by the international 
community working with the private sector and governments to establish and 
implement a comprehensive array of policies, programs, and financial interventions 
that will reduce the costs of trade and create a more transparent and predictable 
environment for regional and global commerce. 
The extreme poor face numerous constraints that limit their capacity to benefit from 
wider economic gains. In this context, trade integration is important not only because 
of the boost to growth it can provide, but also because there is room for it be executed 
in ways that more effectively overcome the constraints faced by the extreme poor. 
[There is a link] between [the] challenges facing people living in extreme poverty and 
their capacity to benefit from trade, as a key driver of growth. [There are] four leading 
characteristics of the poor that have a particularly strong impact on their capacity to 
extract the full potential benefits of trade: rural poverty; fragility and conflict; 
informality; and gender. 
Developing countries gain from lower trade barriers with these large regional trading blocs. 
Currently, in the case of the EU, the tariffs on unprocessed commodities, such as raw coffee 
                                                 
236 Pascal Lamy, Director General; https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm 
237 Marcus Bartley Johns, Paul Brenton, Massimiliano Cali,  Mombert Hoppe, and Roberta Piermartini (2015) 
The Role of Trade in Ending Poverty, World Bank and World Trade Organisation; 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/726971467989468997/The-role-of-trade-in-ending-poverty 
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beans, entering the EU is quite low. But the tariffs on processed coffee is very high. Since the 
majority of the value added comes from processing, this accrues to processors in the EU, 
rather than to processors in developing countries who are effectively barred from the market 
by the tariffs. Lowering these tariffs would allow those in the countries where the coffee 
beans are grown to take a share of this value added. 
 
While the above passage refers to the poor in developing countries, it equally applies to the 
poor in developed countries who would also benefit from increased trade, not least from the 
lower prices on consumer goods that international competition brings.   
 
Of course, there will be losers from lower tariff barriers as the TUC above recognises in its 
objections to CPTPP. But as Daniel Hannan points out: ‘Many more people lose out from 
protectionist policies. The overall effect of an open trading environment on the economy is 
undoubtedly positive’.238 Nevertheless, popular support for free trade agreements is likely to 
rapidly diminish if some of the concerns expressed above by the TUC about CPTPP are 
disregarded. Lower priced goods are of little benefit to people who have lost their 
manufacturing jobs as a result of state-subsidised imports being dumped onto the UK market. 
One of the criteria of the ‘ideal US-UK FTA’ that Hannan supports is the preclusion of 
antidumping measures.  This is unlikely to appeal to workers in either the US or UK whose 
jobs have been displaced by, for example, the dumping of heavily subsidised  Chinese steel. 
It remains a matter of getting the balance right – and this will inevitably be a dynamic process.  
  
                                                 
238 http://ifreetrade.org/ 
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5. The ‘costs’ of Brexit before the UK left the EU 
A number of studies claim to have estimated the supposed ‘costs’ of Brexit before the UK has 
even left the EU. These include the Centre for European Reform  (CER),239 the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR),240 the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS),241 the Bank of 
England,242 and the investment bank UBS.243 John Springford of the CER asserts that ‘the main 
claim made by Brexiters in the Referendum campaign – that Britain could regain sovereignty 
without damaging its economy – has proven to be false’.244 
 
These studies create what is called a ‘doppelgänger UK’, a counterfactual version of the UK 
that did not vote to leave the EU in June 2016.   The doppelgänger UK is constructed from a 
group of countries ‘whose economic characteristics most closely matched those of the UK in 
the run-up to the Brexit Referendum’ using an algorithm called Synth.245 In the case of the 
CER study, the doppelgänger UK is a weighted sum of  the economies of Germany (32%), the 
US (28%), Australia (17%), Iceland (9%), Greece (6%), Luxembourg (4%) and New Zealand 
(4%). 
 
Figure 6 shows how closely correlated were the cumulative growth in GDP in the ‘real’ UK and 
the doppelgänger UK in the eight years prior to the Referendum.  The Figure also shows that 
real UK GDP was 2.9% below doppelgänger UK GDP at the beginning of 2019.  The CEPR study 
‒ whose version of the algorithm gives high weights to Canada, the US, Japan and Hungary ‒ 
predicts, using OECD forecasts, that real UK GDP will be 4% below doppelgänger UK GDP by 
the end of 2020. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
239 John Springford (2019) The Cost of Brexit to June 2019, Centre for European Reform, 16 October; 
https://www.cer.eu/insights/cost-brexit-june-2019.  
240 Benjamin Born, Gernot Müller, Moritz Schularick, Petr Sedláček (2019) £350 million a week: The output cost 
of the Brexit vote, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 29 May; https://voxeu.org/article/300-million-week-
output-cost-brexit-vote 
241 Carl Emmerson, Christine Farquharson and Paul Johnson (2019) IFS Green Budget 2019, Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, 8 October 2019; https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14426  
242 Gertjan Vlieghe (2019) The economic outlook: Fading global tailwinds, intensifying Brexit headwinds, Bank 
of England, 14 February; https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/gertjan-vlieghe-speech-at-the-
resolution-foundation 
243 David Goodman (2018) Brexit Has Already Cost U.K. More Than 2% of GDP, UBS Estimates, Bloomberg News, 3 
September 2018; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-03/brexit-has-already-cost-u-k-more-
than-2-of-gdp-ubs-estimates 
244 John Springford (2019) The Cost of Brexit to June 2019, Centre for European Reform, 16 October; 
https://www.cer.eu/insights/cost-brexit-june-2019. 
245 https://web.stanford.edu/~jhain/synthpage.html 
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Figure 6: Cumulative growth in GDP in the UK and the doppelgänger UK, 2009-2019 
Source: John Springford (2019) The Cost of Brexit to June 2019, Centre for European Reform, 16 October 
How credible is this?  For a start, this is an exercise in pure correlation analysis, there is no 
causality implied by any of these studies.  Further, neither the countries included in the 
doppelgänger nor the country weights are stable across the different studies. The previous 
version of the CER study to the one discussed here had a lower weight for Germany and higher 
weights for the US and Luxembourg – and the model error ‘has also been growing over time 
as the economies of the various countries that form the doppelgänger are affected by factors 
unrelated to Brexit’.  For example, Germany’s manufacturing sector has been hit by trade 
wars, while the US has been growing more strongly partly as a result of tax cuts. Removing 
Germany from the doppelgänger increases the cost of Brexit at the beginning of 2019 to 3.4%, 
while removing the US lowers it to 2.2%, a margin of error of 150% ‒ see Figure 7. The CER 
and CEPR studies have very different countries in their doppelgänger UK. In short, this 
exercise has no economic credibility whatsoever – it is an exercise in measurement without 
theory. It is also noteworthy that all the organisations producing these doppelgänger models 
are opposed to Brexit and/or receive grants from the EU which always require the recipients 
to support the EU and its aims.  
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Figure 7: Cumulative growth in GDP in the UK and the doppelgänger UK, excluding 
Germany and the US, 2009-2019
 
Source: John Springford (2019) The Cost of Brexit to June 2019, Centre for European Reform, 16 October 
Despite this, we can still assess the validity of the main explanations put forward by the 
authors of these studies for the apparently lower GDP as a result of the Brexit Referendum:  
• Increased uncertainty, which temporarily depresses investment and consumption 
spending 
• Failure of the lower value of sterling following the Referendum to increase exports, and 
hence compensate for the fall in domestic spending 
• Anticipated lower future living standards, as the reduction in trade with the continent 
would be likely to make the UK permanently poorer and the lower sterling value makes 
imported goods more expensive. 
 
It is certainly true that some business investment was postponed as a result of uncertainty 
about the UK’s future relationship with the EU. However, investment in the technology sector 
continued to expand, certainly more than in Germany and France as Figure 8 shows.246  Figure 
                                                 
246 Source: TECH NATION, reported in James Cook (2020) How Britain’s technology industry shrugged off 
Brexit fears – and kept on growing, Daily Telegraph, 15 January; 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2020/01/15/britains-technology-industry-shrugged-brexit-fears-
kept-growing/ 
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9 shows that the number of UK unicorns (business start-ups worth more than $1bn) also 
continued to grow and is almost double that of Germany and France combined.247  Business 
confidence returned, according to the January 2020 CBI survey of manufacturers,248 and 
general business investment began to recover following Boris Johnson’s General Election 
victory in December 2019.249  Investors also showed their confidence in the UK by increasing 
their allocation to UK equities.250 Further, while general inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) also fell in 2017-18 compared with 2016, this was from an unusually high level in 2016 
and the FDI level in 2018 at £64.5bn was higher than for 2013-15.251  Consumption actually 
increased following the Referendum by 5.6%, but this is less than the 7.2% increase in the 
doppelgänger UK.  
Figure 8: Investment in the technology sector of the UK, Germany and France, 2014-19
 
Source: TECH NATION, reported in James Cook (2020) How Britain’s technology industry shrugged off 
Brexit fears – and kept on growing, Daily Telegraph, 15 January 
                                                 
247 Ditto. 
248 https://www.cbi.org.uk/media-centre/articles/uk-manufacturing-business-optimism-improves-at-the-
strongest-pace-since-2014-cbi/ 
249 Julian Jessop (2020) Has Brexit Britain turned the corner?, Global Vision, 24 February; 
https://globalvisionuk.com/has-brexit-britain-turned-the-corner/ 
250 Lauren Mason (2020) Multi-managers pile into UK equities at highest allocation since Brexit referendum: 2019 
General Election result also key factor, Investment Week, 24 February; 
https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/news/4011144/multi-managers-pile-uk-equities-allocation-brexit-
referendum 
 
251  
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
FDI (£bn) 51.7 26.7 39.2 196.1 101.2 64.5 
Source: UNCTAD; https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf 
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Figure 9: Cumulative number of $1bn start-ups by year
Source: TECH NATION, reported in James Cook (2020) How Britain’s technology industry shrugged off 
Brexit fears – and kept on growing, Daily Telegraph, 15 January 
The sharp fall in the exchange rate for sterling against the dollar following the Referendum by 
12%252 resulted in UK exports growing faster than imports between 2016 and mid-2018, but 
then the effect dissipated. Figure 10 shows that the fall in sterling did little to improve exports 
relative to G7 economies.253  Import growth, by contrast, was slower than in the G7, as Figure 
11 shows. However, the depreciation of sterling increased the cost of intermediate inputs for 
UK businesses. This, according to the London School Economist, lowered wage growth and 
reduced training opportunities in these businesses.254 The fall in sterling also had an 
inflationary impact on UK consumers. The LSE estimated that consumer prices increased by 
2.9%,255 helping to offset increases in nominal wages: real wages were broadly unchanged 
between the Referendum and 2018, but increased during 2019.  
                                                 
252 1 GBP = 1.4893 USD (23 June 2016) and 1 GBP = 1.3109 EUR (23 July 2016);  
https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2016.html 
253 Josh De Lyon and Swati Dhingra (2020) UK economy since the Brexit vote: slower GDP growth, lower 
productivity, and a weaker pound, LSE blog; https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/03/22/uk-economy-
since-the-brexit-vote-slower-gdp-growth-lower-productivity-and-a-weaker-pound/ 
254 Ditto. 
255 Found by taking 0.29 (the share of imports in UK consumer expenditure) and multiplying by 10% (the fall in 
an import-weighted sterling exchange rate index). See Holger Breinlich, Elsa Leromain, Dennis Novy and 
Thomas Sampson (2019) Exchange Rates and Consumer Prices: Evidence from Brexit, Centre for Economic 
Performance Discussion Paper 1667, London School of Economics, December 2019; 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1667.pdf 
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Figure 10: Export growth, UK and G7, 2014-18 
 
Source: Josh De Lyon and Swati Dhingra (2020) UK economy since the Brexit vote: slower GDP growth, lower 
productivity, and a weaker pound, LSE blog 
Figure 11: Import growth, UK and G7, 2014-18 
 
Source: Josh De Lyon and Swati Dhingra (2020) UK economy since the Brexit vote: slower GDP growth, lower 
productivity, and a weaker pound, LSE blog 
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According to economist Julian Jessop, the estimates of a loss of GDP of 3% or more since the 
Referendum are exaggerated.  He puts the loss at no more than 2%, not least because, with 
employment levels at their highest recorded levels, the economy just did not have the 
capacity to grow at a faster rate.256 He contrasts this with the Treasury’s warnings at the time 
of the Referendum that GDP would be 6% lower within two years and unemployment 820,000 
higher.257 He is particularly critical of the LSE study on exchange rates: ‘The study assumes 
that higher import costs are passed on in full to consumers and that they are unable to avoid 
them by switching to domestic goods and services. It also ignores other channels through 
which the fall in the exchange rate might have had a positive impact on the economy and on 
at least some households, including the boosts to competitiveness and asset prices.258 But my 
main objection is the assumption that the fall in the exchange rate is permanent’,259 pointing 
out that sterling has risen by 6% on a trade-weighted basis since Boris Johnson became prime 
minister. In 2019, the UK grew faster than Germany, France, Italy and Japan, and was the third 
fastest growing country behind the US and Canada amongst the G7 economies. 
  
                                                 
256 Julian Jessop (2020) Has Brexit Britain turned the corner?, Global Vision, 24 February; 
https://globalvisionuk.com/has-brexit-britain-turned-the-corner/ 
257 HM Treasury Analysis: The Immediate Economic Impact of Leaving the EU, May 2016; 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524967/
hm_treasury_analysis_the_immediate_economic_impact_of_leaving_the_eu_web.pdf 
258 Individuals and institutional investors, such as pension funds, with overseas investments, experience an 
increase in the sterling value of those investments when the exchange falls, This generates a wealth effect 
which increases consumption.  This is not taken into account in the LSE study. 
259 Julian Jessop (2020) The problem with the big ‘cost of Brexit’ numbers, CAPX, 29 January;  
https://capx.co/the-problem-with-the-big-cost-of-brexit-numbers/ 
 
77 
 
6. The costs and benefits of the WTO or ‘no deal’ option 
In this final section, we review various studies that have estimated the costs and benefits of 
trading with the EU without a formal trade deal, i.e., what has become known as the WTO or 
‘no deal’ option.  
 
6.1 Estimating the costs of ‘no deal’  
If there is a ‘no-deal’ Brexit agreement between the UK and EU, the worst-case scenario is to 
trade with the rest of the world – including the EU – on the basis of WTO most favoured nation 
(MFN) tariffs.260 The UK is free to set its own tariffs, but the same tariffs must be applied to 
all countries (unless a FTA is agreed with specific countries or trading blocs).  Table 6 shows 
that the average WTO-MFN tariff is around 3.1%.261 Services, such as financial services and 
transport, are not covered by standard WTO agreements, so a separate agreement with the 
EU would need to be implemented for these.  There are also non-tariff barriers: Kee and Nicita 
(2017) estimate that average NTBs imposed by the EU on imported goods, despite being 
discriminatory and hence illegal under WTO rules, are equivalent to an additional tariff of 
3.6%.262 The sum of tariff and non-tariff barriers at 6.8% is half the 14% fall in the sterling 
exchange rate against the euro that followed the Referendum.263 Even if we assume higher 
average tariffs of 4%264 and NTBs equivalent to an additional tariff of 10.5% – as estimated by 
the UK government in January 2018265 – the total additional cost of 14.5% is still substantially 
ameliorated by sterling’s depreciation.  Further, as previously mentioned, the UK would be a 
net recipient of £7.7bn of the WTO-MFN tariffs (£12.9bn received less £5.2bn paid out).266 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
260 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
261 A figure of 3% is reported in Richard Barfield (2018), UK trade and the World Trade Organisation:  A Brexit 
briefing for non-specialists, September;  
https://brexitfactbase.com/pdfs/UKTradeWTO.pdf 
262 Hiau Looi Kee and Alessandro Nicita (2017) Short-term impact of Brexit on the UK’s exports of goods, Vox 
Blog, World Bank and UNCTAD. 
263 1 GBP = 1.309 EUR (23 June 2016) and 1 GBP = 1.123 (23 October 2016) or 1.100 EUR (15 March 2020);  
https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-EUR-spot-exchange-rates-history-2016.html 
264 The average EU tariff is around 4% (https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-
7851/CBP-7851.pdf) and 2.8% for non-agricultural products 
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit08_book.pdf) 
265 See page 9 of EU Exit Analysis: Cross-Whitehall Briefing, January 2018 (prepared for House of Commons 
Exiting the European Union Committee); https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/Exiting-the-European-Union/17-19/Cross-Whitehall-briefing/EU-Exit-Analysis-Cross-Whitehall-
Briefing.pdf.  
266 Justin Protts (2016) Potential post-Brexit tariff costs for EU-UK trade, Civitas, October; 
https://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/potentialpostbrexittariffcostsforeuuktrade.pdf 
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Table 6: WTO – Most favoured nation tariffs 
Tariff (%) Weight (%) 
0 43.7% 
>0% to 5% 45.9% 
>5% to 10% 7.5% 
>10%  3.0% 
Average tariff ≈ 3.1% (using 40% as the average tariff above 10%) 
Source: www.brexittoolkit.co.uk; Sir David Ord, Bristol Ports 
 
The US trades more – under WTO-MFN rules – with the EU than does the UK.  In 2018, US 
goods exports to the EU were $319bn, while its goods imports were $488 billion, implying a 
goods trade deficit with the EU of $169bn. US service exports to the EU were $256bn, while 
its services imports were $196bn, implying a services trade surplus of $60bn.267  Total US 
exports to the EU were therefore of the order of $575bn, while total US imports from the EU 
were of the order of $684bn. In comparison, in 2018, total UK exports to the EU were £289bn 
($384bn), while total UK imports from the EU were £345bn ($459bn).268 
 
At the time of the Referendum, the Treasury estimated that there would be a 24% reduction 
in trade and a 7.5% reduction in GDP in the event of ‘no deal’ which imposed WTO-MFN tariffs 
and NTBs on trade with the EU.269 The Treasury used a ‘gravity’ model of trade270 to derive 
this estimate. This model assumes that trade between countries increases with the size of 
their economies and reduces as the distance between them increases. A change in tariffs and 
NTBs will change the level of trade and this will have knock-on effects on wider 
macroeconomic variables, such as investment, productivity, and GDP.  Assumptions need to 
be made about the size of these knock-on effects.  
 
One key assumption relates to the linkage between foreign direct investment (FDI) – which 
the Treasury model ‘assumes’ will fall as a result of the reduction in trade – and a 
consequential change in productivity. However, the Treasury model overestimated the 
impact of EU membership on FDI inflows. It made the assumption that EU membership 
increases both internal and external FDI inflows by 35% – and that FDI inflows would fall by 
                                                 
267 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union 
268 Statistics on UK-EU trade, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, Number 7851, 24 July 2019; 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7851/CBP-7851.pdf; Average USD/GBP exchange 
rate for 2018 was 1.33. 
269 H. M. Treasury (2016a) H M Treasury Analysis: The Long-term Economic Impact of UK Membership and the 
Alternatives, Cm 9250, April; H. M. Treasury, (2016b) The Immediate Economic Impact of Leaving the EU, Cm 
9292, May. 
270 Introduced by Walter Isard (1954) Location Theory and Trade Theory: Short-Run Analysis, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 68(2), 305–320. Later developed by Jan Tinbergen (1962) Shaping the World Economy, The 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York. 
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the same percentage if the UK left the EU – whereas there has been no significant increase in 
FDI inflows into EU member states from outside the EU (except for into the UK).271  
 
Another key assumption relates to the linkage between a reduction in trade and a 
consequential change in productivity. The Treasury model ‘assumes’ a significant fall in 
productivity in response to a reduction in trade (in part, via the ‘assumed’ reduction in FDI), 
whereas there is no relationship between the growth rate in goods trade and the growth rate 
in per capita GDP (a key measure of productivity improvements) in OECD countries over the 
period 1980-2015.272 Indeed, David Frost, the UK’s chief trade negotiator with the EU, goes 
further and argue that ‘there is at least as much evidence that the relationship is the other 
way around – that it is actually productivity which drives trade. The claims that trade drives 
productivity are often in fact based on the very specific experience of emerging countries 
opening up to world markets, beginning to trade on global terms after a period of 
authoritarian or communist government – these are transitions that involve a huge 
improvement in the institutional framework and which make big productivity improvements 
almost inevitable. And I think the relevance of such experiences drawn from that for the UK, 
a high-income economy which has been extremely open for over a century, seems highly 
limited to me’.273 
 
The gravity model also overemphasises the importance of geographical proximity in the case 
of countries with a high share of services in national output (80% in the case of the UK), since, 
as Walsh (2006) has demonstrated, services trade is influenced by size of economy and 
common language, but not by distance.274 As we pointed out above, Japan and Australia buy 
more UK services than the average EU member state.275 
 
Let’s do a quick reality check. UK exports to the EU amounted to around 14% of UK GDP in 
2018, additional tariffs and NTBs lie between 6.8% and 14.5%, and sterling has fallen by 14% 
against the euro since the Referendum. Yet the Treasury estimates that UK GDP will fall by 
                                                 
271 See pp. 18-19 of Ken Coutts, Graham Gudgin and Jordan Buchanan (2017) How the Economics Profession 
Got It Wrong on Brexit, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 493, 
January. Further, most of what are classified as FDI inflows into the UK are related to mergers and acquisitions, 
rather than representing genuine new investment. 
272 Hiau Looi Kee and Alessandro Nicita (2017) Short-term impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom's export of 
goods, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8195, November; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036712. 
See also Chart 7 in Ken Coutts, Graham Gudgin and Jordan Buchanan (2017) How the Economics Profession 
Got It Wrong on Brexit, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 493, 
January. 
273 Speech at ULB Brussels University on the British government’s plans for a UK-EU trade deal on 17 February 
2020; https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2020/02/full-text-top-uk-brexit-negotiator-david-frost-on-his-plans-for-an-
eu-trade-deal/amp/?__twitter_impression=true 
274 Walsh, K. (2006) Trade in Services: Does Gravity Hold? A Gravity Model Approach to Estimating Barriers to 
Services Trade, Discussion Paper Series, no 183, Revenue Commissioners, Dublin. 
275 ‘Brexit Britain is servicing the World’ - latest official figures are revealed, Facts4eu, February 2020; 
https://facts4eu.org/news/2020_feb_UK_services_the_world 
80 
 
7.5%, i.e., the UK will lose 54% of its exports to the EU when it leaves the EU, and those exports 
will not be diverted to other markets.  In the words of John McEnroe, ‘you cannot be serious’. 
 
The Treasury, in response to the criticisms it received,276 subsequently changed the model it 
used. It switched to a ‘computable general equilibrium’ model of trade called GTAP.277 
However, the model was calibrated to produce a fall in GDP in the event of a ‘no deal’ of 7.7%, 
virtually unchanged from the model used at the time of the Referendum.278 The 7.7% is made 
up as follows: 1% due to tariffs, 1.1% NTBs (immediate loss of access), 3.4% NTBs (gradual 
regulatory divergence), 1.3% NTBs (customs) and 0.9% (migration controls).279,280  In other 
words, of the estimated fall of 7.7% in GDP, 5.8% (or 75% of the total) is due to NTBs that are 
illegal under WTO and other international rules and conventions.  For example, there are: the 
WTO Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of non-discrimination;281 the legal obligation to 
allow timely customs clearance of inwards goods under the WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement;282 international agreements on product regulations,283 on services trade and 
regulations284 and on government procurement contracts;285 the G20 global principles of 
2009 which recognise that the free flow of capital is critical for the real economy; the BIS 
support for a level playing field in financial services; and making use of ‘reverse solicitation 
exemptions’ which allow financial institutions to provide cross-border services to a wholesale 
                                                 
276 See, e.g., David Blake (2016) Measurement without Theory: On the extraordinary abuse of economic models 
in the EU Referendum debate, City University of London, June; 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2819954 
277 Global Trade Analysis Project at Purdue University. This is a more ‘classical’ model of trade and has both a 
‘supply’ side (involving production functions with factors of production, such as labour and capital) and a 
‘demand’ side (like the gravity model).  
278 See page 16 of EU Exit Analysis: Cross-Whitehall Briefing, January 2018 (prepared for House of Commons 
Exiting the European Union Committee); https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/Exiting-the-European-Union/17-19/Cross-Whitehall-briefing/EU-Exit-Analysis-Cross-Whitehall-
Briefing.pdf 
279 See page 18 of EU Exit Analysis: Cross Whitehall Briefing, January 2018 (prepared for House of Commons 
Exiting the European Union Committee); https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/Exiting-the-European-Union/17-19/Cross-Whitehall-briefing/EU-Exit-Analysis-Cross-Whitehall-
Briefing.pdf.  
280 A study by Oliver Wyman and Clifford Chance in March 2018 estimated the cost to the UK of WTO-MFN 
tariff and NTBs at 1.5% of gross value added (GDP plus taxes on products minus subsidies on products) or 
£27bn. This is equivalent to around 11.5% of the value of UK exports to the EU. The cost to the EU27 would be 
£31bn or 0.4% of GVA (The ‘Red Tape’ Cost of Brexit).  
281 Shanker Singham and Catherine McBride (2018) Improving Global Financial Services Regulation, Institute of 
Economic Affairs, May. 
282 World Trade Organisation (2018) The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement; 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm 
283 The Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 1979, and the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, 1995 (covers food safety and animal and plant health).  
284 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 2000; Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) currently being 
negotiated by 23 members of the WTO which account for 70% of world trade in services. 
285 WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). 
81 
 
client without being registered or authorised in that client’s state, provided that the services 
are provided on the initiative of the client.286 
 
Even if there will be new and unavoidable frictional costs, the Treasury has grossly 
overestimated them. The Treasury estimates that there will be a 1.3% reduction in GDP due 
to frictional border (i.e., customs) costs. Yet if the same border costs as in the EU’s trade deal 
with Switzerland are applied to the UK, these amount to just 0.14% of GDP, around ten times 
lower.287 The new model has been used to predict that the max-fac proposal would wipe 1.8% 
off GDP.288 Back to John McEnroe for a comment. 
 
Using different modelling assumptions, Kee and Nicita (2017)289 estimate that UK exports to 
the EU would fall by just 2% in a ‘no deal’ scenario, while Coutts et al (2018)290 estimate that, 
by 2030, per capita GDP would be unchanged, while GDP would be 2% lower than otherwise, 
due to lower immigration.291  
 
In other words, the costs of a ‘no-deal’ outcome are not significant in the long term. Further, 
a ‘no-deal’ agreement ‘would not result in a major slowdown or recession’, since 
policymakers will respond in ways that reduces the consequences. This is the prediction of a 
study by Capital Economics.292 While there would be some economic dislocation with growth 
falling below 1%, the government would react with a combination of low interest rates, low 
taxes and increased subsidies to counteract the market shock.  
 
                                                 
286 Barnabas Reynolds (2017) The Art of the No Deal: How Best to Navigate Brexit for Financial Services, 
Politeia, November; Continuity of Contracts and Business on a “Hard” Brexit: Human Rights and Reverse 
Solicitation to the Rescue!, Shearman & Sterling, 31 October 2017. 
287 Professor Dr Michael Ambühl, Professor of Negotiation and Conflict Management at ETH Zurich and former 
Swiss State Secretary, who negotiated one of the Swiss bilateral FTAs with the EU, estimates that border costs 
in the EU-Swiss FTAs are 0.1% of the value of trade. Given that UK trade with the EU is equal to 14% of UK 
GDP, border costs would amount to only 0.014% of GDP. Further, only 1% of goods are physically inspected 
(Slide 8 of Michael Ambühl (2018) Where Next on Brexit? Lessons from the Swiss Model, Policy Exchange 
presentation, London, 19 April). 
288 Alex Spence and Alberto Nardelli (2018) The Brexiteers' Customs Plan Would Wipe 1.8% Off GDP, Ministers 
Have Been Told, BuzzFeed, 9 May; https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexspence/the-brexiteers-customs-plan-
would-hurt-145000-uk-companies?utm_term=.fbO0RWNOm#.hc8ORqex6 
289 Using a direct model of trade which directly calculates the additions to production costs from tariffs and 
NTBs and uses sector- or commodity-specific elasticities to estimate the impact on demand for exports and 
imports. 
290 Using a macro-economic model – similar to that used by both Cambridge Econometrics and Oxford 
Economics – estimated using actual historical data rather than derived from general equilibrium theory and 
assumptions as in the Treasury model. See Chart 8 in Ken Coutts, Graham Gudgin and Jordan Buchanan (2017) 
How the Economics Profession Got It Wrong on Brexit, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge 
Working Paper No. 493, January. 
291 This would have the additional benefit of reducing the strain on the UK’s housing, transport, school and 
hospital infrastructure. 
292 Brexit: where are we now?, 8 November 2017.  
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6.2 Estimating the benefits from ‘no deal’  
Not only did the Treasury assume the costs to the UK of leaving the EU would be high, it also 
assumed that the gains from ‘general free trade via FTAs’ with the rest of the world would be 
low, increasing UK GDP by only 0.5-0.8%. This is despite the fact that, as the EU itself 
concedes, 90% of future global economic growth will take place outside the EU. This could 
only be explained by assuming that EU trade barriers are very low. 
 
However, Professor Patrick Minford estimates that EU tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade 
in food and manufactures raise their prices by 20%, or by an average of 8% across all goods 
purchased.293  EU trade barriers against the rest of the world reduce UK GDP by 7% (£144bn 
pa), while the UK remains a member.294  This is made up of a 4% cut in GDP due to lower 
productivity295 and a 2% cut in GDP due to the costs of excessive EU regulations.296 The 
remaining 1% is accounted for by the net UK contribution to the EU Budget (0.6% of GDP),297 
and the taxpayer subsidy in the form of in-work benefits to unskilled immigration (0.2% of 
GDP)298 and other factors (0.2% of GDP).   
 
By leaving the EU and removing these trade barriers, the UK will be able to recover this loss 
in GDP, which to reiterate comes from four sources: moving to free trade with non-EU 
countries that currently face high tariff and non-tariff barriers on goods and services imports; 
substituting UK-based regulation for EU-based Single Market regulation; ending the Budget 
                                                 
293 For more on EU NTBs, see K. Berden, J. Francois, S. Tamminen, M. Thelle, and P. Wymenga (2009) Non-
Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and Investment: An Economic Analysis,  Final report, Ecorys ‒ Table of NTBs 
on p 123. Cited in H. Breinlich, S. Dhingra, G. Ottaviano, T. Sampson, J. Van Reenen, and J. Wadsworth (2016) 
‘BREXIT 2016: Policy analysis from the Centre for Economic Performance’, London School of Economics.   
294 Patrick Minford (2018) From Project Fear to Project Prosperity, Economists for Free Trade, 15 August; 
https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/From-Project-Fear-to-Project-
Prosperity-An-Introduction-15-Aug-17-2.pdf 
295 UK companies protected by trade barriers are less competitive and hence invest less in new productivity-
enhancing physical capital. They also have access to a large pool of unskilled immigrants from the poorer parts 
of the EU, significantly reducing their incentive to train and hence improve the human capital of British 
workers, especially poorly educated and poorly motivated school leavers.  Both factors help to reduce UK 
productivity. 
296 EU regulations raise business costs and Minford estimates that the benefit from replacing them with 
regulations more suited to the interests of UK producers and consumers is 2% of GDP which would be 
gradually achieved over a fifteen-year period, adding 0.15% pa to GDP over that period. See also Patrick 
Minford (2018, p.10) How the Civil Service has misled us on the Costs of Brexit and the Customs Union, 
Economists for Free Trade, May; https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/EFT-
How-the-Civil-Service-has-misled-us-on-costs-of-Brexit-and-the-customs-union-May-2018.pdf 
297 Estimate from the Office of Budget Responsibility. 
298 In-work benefits for 2.4m EEA nationals cost the Treasury £4.4 billion in 2014/15 or £1,800 per capita, 
equivalent to a 20% wage subsidy (https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2017/12/andrew-green-the-
immigration-policy-that-we-need-after-brexit.html). Other benefits include free education and health care. 
See: Paul Ashton, Neil MacKinnon, and Patrick Minford (2016) The Economics of Unskilled Immigration, 
Economists for Free Trade, September; http://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/the-economics- of-unskilled-
immigration.  
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contribution to the EU; and ending the subsidy that Single Market membership obliges the 
UK to give to EU unskilled immigrants. 
 
This will not be without some cost, however. UK companies will face greater competition for 
the goods and services that they produce and they will have to become more competitive if 
they are to maintain their market share and increase their exports. This will, in turn, have two 
effects. The first is to reduce domestic prices. The second will be to increase investment in 
both physical and human capital in order to increase productivity.299 But this is the only way 
in the long run to increase trade and prosperity. The costs can be reduced if the economy is 
sufficiently flexible, especially the labour market. Workers made redundant in industries now 
open to fair international competition can be retrained to work in different parts of the 
economy where demand for labour is growing. A further benefit arises from ending the 
unrestricted immigration of unskilled EU workers. This had the effect of depressing the wages 
of unskilled UK workers in areas of high immigration. This represented a transfer from those 
unskilled UK workers to the consumers who used their products and services. This 
distributional effect can reversed (at least partially) when unrestricted EU immigration 
ends.300 The number of EU workers in the UK peaked in 2017 at just below 2.5mn and has 
been falling at the rate of around 150,000 p.a. since.  Real wages in the UK have been growing 
since 2018 at the rate of around 0.8% (excluding bonuses), as employers are having to 
compete for workers.301 By December 2019, average real wages in the UK had recovered to 
their previous highest recorded level which was in February 2008 just before the start of the 
Great Recession, while employment was at its highest level of 33mn.302 
 
Using a computable general equilibrium model of trade similar to the GTAP model,303 Minford 
estimates that if EU trade barriers on food and manufactures were reduced from 20% to 10%, 
                                                 
299 Minford is not the only economist to argue that lowering trade barriers helps to increase productivity. Ian 
Mitchell believes that Brexit provides a ‘genuine opportunity for UK global leadership [in implementing a 
sustainable, market-orientated agricultural policy] outside the EU in the next decade… [This] would lower 
prices for consumers, lift the economy’s productivity and allow for substantial budget savings to support the 
environment and public finances… [especially given that there is] no real prospect of substantial reform of the 
EU agricultural model in the next decade’.  See: Ian Mitchell (2017) The Implications of Brexit for UK, EU and 
Global Agricultural Reform in the Next Decade, Chatham House, 2 November; 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/implications-brexit-uk-eu-and-global-agricultural-reform-next-
decade). 
300 Neil MacKinnon (2018) Immigration: A Central Brexit Issue, Economists for Free Trade, November; 
https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Immigration-a- central- Brexit-
issue.pdf  
301 Gavin Jackson (2018) Fall in EU workers is UK’s steepest since records began: Businesses warn of labour 
shortages as they struggle to fill jobs, Financial Times, 13 November;  
https://www.ft.com/content/1d23012e-e723-11e8-8a85-04b8afea6ea3 
302 Annual average real earnings (deflated by CPIH) were £26,700 in both February 2008 and December 2019. 
Source: UK Budget Statement, HM Treasury, 12 March 2020; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-2020-documents/budget-2020 
303 Called the Cardiff World Trade Model. 
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UK GDP would rise by 4% and consumer prices would fall by 8%.304,305 Removing excessive 
Single Market regulatory burdens could add another 2% to UK GDP.  As an interim measure, 
tariffs could be lowered on imported goods that the UK does not have a domestic industry to 
protect, such as tea, coffee and oranges. Similarly, the 14% devaluation of sterling against the 
euro following the Referendum raised the prices of imports by 14%; the prices of these 
imports could be restored to their pre-Referendum levels by abolishing all import tariffs of 
14% or less.306 Minford estimates additionally that if the UK left the EU without a deal, then 
under WTO rules, the tariffs collected by the UK on EU imports are worth £650 billion in 
present value terms.307  
 
One of the world’s most successful trade liberalisation policies is that of Australia, beginning 
in 1986. Using the GTAP model, this has been shown to have increased Australia’s GDP by 
5.4%,308 which is even larger than the 4% gain predicted by Minford. 
 
Finally, we should note the limits to protectionism. Hiding behind the protective wall of the 
Common External Tariff did not prevent the share of UK manufacturing in GDP falling from 
35% when the UK joined the EU to around 8% now.309   
  
                                                 
304 Patrick Minford, Sakshi Gupta, Vo Phuong Mai Le, Vidya Mahambare, Yongdeng Xu (2015, chapter 4) Should 
Britain Leave the EU? An Economic Analysis of a Troubled Relationship, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; Patrick 
Minford (2018, p.9) How the Civil Service has misled us on the Costs of Brexit and the Customs Union, Economists 
for Free Trade, May; https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/EFT-How-the-
Civil-Service-has-misled-us-on-costs-of-Brexit-and-the-customs-union-May-2018.pdf 
305 Furthermore, there would be a particular benefit to UK low- income households of about 15% of their living 
costs from the combination of ending the unskilled immigrant subsidy and the trade-led reduction in the 
consumer prices. See: Neil MacKinnon (2018) Immigration: A Central Brexit Issue, Economists for Free Trade, 
November https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Immigration-a- central- 
Brexit-issue.pdf. 
306 As recommended in Patrick Minford (2017) A Budget for Brexit 2017, Economists for Free Trade, November. 
307 Patrick Minford (2019) No Deal is the best deal for the UK, Economists for Free Trade, March;  
https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/No-Deal-is-the-best-deal-for-the-
UK.pdf 
308 Centre for International Economics (2017) Australian Trade Liberalisation - analysis of the impacts, report 
prepared for the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CIE, Canberra and Sydney; https://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/trade-investment/Documents/cie-report-trade-liberalisation.pdf  
309 Patrick Minford (2018) From Project Fear to Project Prosperity, Economists for Free Trade, 15 August; 
https://www.economistsforfreetrade.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/From-Project-Fear-to-Project-
Prosperity-An-Introduction-15-Aug-17-2.pdf 
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7. Conclusion  
The UK’s prospects for trade and prosperity after Brexit will be inversely related to the size of 
the tariffs on international trade that the UK itself sets. The lower the tariff barriers, the 
brighter the prospects will be.  A study by the UK Trade Policy Observatory at the University 
of Sussex estimated that if the UK imposed WTO-MFN tariffs on EU imports after Brexit, this 
would increase the ‘average cost of living by around 1% and increase it for 8% of households 
by 2% or more’.310 Similarly, the Treasury predicts a 7.7% reduction in GDP in the event of ‘no 
deal’ in which the UK retained the existing Common External Tariff with the rest of the world 
and also imposed the same tariffs on trade with the EU. But why would the UK government 
do this? It would be a policy choice, not a consequence of Brexit.  
 
So long as the UK government liberates itself from the protectionist mercantilist mindset of 
the EU – which regards trade as a weapon – and reduces trade barriers after Brexit, and UK 
businesses respond positively to the challenge of increased international competition, the 
prospects for UK trade and prosperity post-Brexit are very bright indeed. EU barriers on trade 
in food and manufactures raise their prices by 20%, or by an average of 8% across all goods 
purchased. If these barriers were reduced from 20% to 10%, UK GDP would rise by 4%. 
Removing excessive Single Market regulatory burdens could add another 2% to UK GDP. If 
anyone questions the plausibility of these numbers, they only have to look at Australia’s move 
to free trade which added 5.4% to its GDP. 
 
Furthermore, on the basis of both international and EU law, the monetary costs to the UK of 
leaving the EU should be fairly low. Similarly, the frictional costs to both the UK and the EU of 
their post-Brexit relationship should also be low.311 However, as a consequence of both the 
concessions made to date by the UK in order to demonstrate its goodwill and the hard line 
taken by the EU in order to discourage other member states from leaving, these costs could 
well end up being much higher than they need be for both sides. The EU’s ‘level playing field’ 
demand, laid out in its negotiating Guidelines for a future trading relationship, is worse than 
a standard ‘no compete’ clause when a senior employee leaves a company.  The EU wants to 
put the UK on permanent gardening leave. It would effectively prevent the UK from achieving 
regulatory autonomy or from pursuing an independent trade policy. To avoid all this this, it is 
vital that the issues raised in this article are fully recognised.  
 
We should also bear in mind the counterfactual and ask what it would be like to remain in the 
EU.  The EU is like the Titanic, but with a big difference. Whereas Captain Edward Smith of the 
Titanic did not see the iceberg in his path, Captain Ursula von der Leyen and First Officer 
                                                 
310 S. Clarke, I. Serwicka, and L. A. Winters (2017) Will Brexit raise the cost of living?, National Institute 
Economic Review, Issue 242, October; https://www.niesr.ac.uk/publications/will-brexit-raise-cost-living 
311 In the EU-Swiss FTA, only 1% of goods are physically inspected and the actual ‘frictional’ cost to traders at 
the border is only about 0.1% of the value of the goods. Presentation at Policy Exchange on 19 April 2018 by 
Professor Dr Michael Ambühl. 
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Michel Barnier of the good ship ‘European Union’ knows full well that there is an iceberg – 
indeed multiple icebergs – in their path, but believes that collective political will in the EU is 
strong enough to plough straight through: it is going to be a very bumpy ride for those 
remaining on board. 
  
